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Record W2291682920 · doi:10.1145/2808797.2808904

Network vs Market Relations

2015· article· en· W2291682920 on OpenAlexaff
Emőke-Ágnes Horvát, Jayaram Uparna, Brian Uzzi

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldBusiness, Management and Accounting
TopicFinTech, Crowdfunding, Digital Finance
Canadian institutionsKellogg's (Canada)
FundersArmy Research LaboratoryDefense Advanced Research Projects Agency
KeywordsReciprocity (cultural anthropology)CrowdsLoanSocial capitalBusinessFinancial marketInterpersonal tiesTrustworthinessEconomicsMonetary economicsMicroeconomicsFinanceSociologySocial psychologyComputer sciencePsychologyComputer security

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Crowds offer a new form of efficacious collective decision making, yet knowledge about the mechanisms by which they achieve superior outcomes remains nascent. It has been suggested that crowds work best with market-like relationships when individuals make independent decisions and possess dissimilar information. By contrast, sociological discussions of markets argue that risky decisions are mitigated by network relations that embed economic transactions in social ties that promote trustworthiness and reciprocity. To investigate the role of networks within crowds and their performance effects, we examined the complete record of financial lending decisions on Prosper.com, 1/2006-3/2012, the first U.S. crowdfunding platform and a chief gateway to capital for entrepreneurs and general borrowers that continues to disrupt conventional financial lending structures infusing more than $5.1 billion into the market in 2013. Our study reveals how reciprocity, recurring borrower-lender dyads, and persistent co-lending underpin the dynamics of network lending. Further, we show how network ties influence the evolution of the lending behavior. We find that in the early stage of fundraising, network relations provide larger proportions of loans, typically lending four times more per bid than strangers. They also respond to loan requests on average 59.5% sooner than strangers. The size of the first loan and the time to lending also tend to prompt lending by strangers, suggesting that network relations might move the market, a finding that persists even as fewer lenders dominate more of the market for loans on Prosper. Finally, network relations are associated with greater engagement: when the first loan is underwritten by a friend, 50% of the remaining loans come from friends as well.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: Not applicable
GenreCandidate signal: Other · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.898
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.001
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.001
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0010.004

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.030
GPT teacher head0.213
Teacher spread0.183 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; both teacher heads agree on what is shown here.

Study designNot applicable
Domainnot available
GenreOther

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations26
Published2015
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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