Security middleware infrastructure for medical imaging system integration and monitoring
Bibliographic record
Abstract
With the increasing demand for electronic medical records sharing, it is a challenge for medical imaging service providers to protect the patient privacy and IT infrastructure security in an integrated environment. In this paper, we present a novel security middleware infrastructure for seamlessly and securely linking legacy medical imaging systems, diagnostic imaging web applications as well as mobile applications. In this infrastructure, software agents such as user agent and security agent have been integrated into medical imaging domains that can be trained to perform their tasks. The proposed security middleware utilizes both online security technologies such as authentication, authorization and accounting, as well as post security operations to discover system security vulnerability. By integrating with the proposed security middleware, both legacy system users and Internet users can be uniformly identified and authenticated; access to patient diagnostic images can be controlled based on patient's consent directives and other access control polices defined at a central point; relevant user access activities can be audited at a central repository; user access behavior patterns are studied by utilizing data mining techniques; the explored behavior patterns provide system administrators valuable knowledge to refine existing security policies; behavior-based access control is enforced by capturing user's dynamic behavior and determining their access rights through comparing with the discovered knowledge of common behaviors. A case study is presented based on the proposed infrastructure.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.003 | 0.006 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.004 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.004 | 0.002 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".