Bibliographic record
Abstract
(Op-Ed) - SHADOW OF ISLAMIC STATE HANGS OVER RUSSIA. (By Aleksandr Shumilin, director of the Center Analysis of Middle East Conflicts at the Russian Academy of Sciences' US and Canada Institute. The Moscow Times, June 24, 2015, p. 8. Complete text:) It is impossible to say with certainty how many people holding Russian passports now fight the Islamic State [of Iraq and Sham]. This is because such volunteers hail not only from Russia itself, but also from former Soviet republics and communities of North Caucasus refugees now living in Europe. What's more, once they join up with ISIS in, say, Syria or Iraq, they do not always reveal their nationality immediately, hoping to protect loved ones back in Russia from negative repercussions. ... What is interesting in this regard is the fact that the Russian Internal Affairs Ministry and the Federal Security Service [FSB] offer different estimates of their numbers. For example, the Internal Affairs Ministry reported that approximately 800 Russian citizens were fighting ISIS in early 2015, increasing that number only modestly in subsequent months. ... By contrast, the FSB kicked off the year with an estimate of more than double that figure - 1,700 Russians - and by June, agency head Aleksandr Bortnikov was already quoting a figure of closer to 5,000. ... That discrepancy probably stems from each agency's differing goals. The Internal Affairs Ministry probably tends to underestimate their numbers so as to discourage the domestic and global press from implicating Russia in ISIS attacks. ... However, the FSB is reporting higher numbers. [This is done] firstly in order to show the scale of the Islamist underground threat Russia faces that the agency must battle, and secondly to prove that the FSB has made it so difficult the terrorists to operate on Russian territory that they must go abroad instead to fight the ISIS. ... These volunteers leave their homes in different countries - including Europe and the US - to join the ranks of terrorists in Syria and Iraq primarily because they have grown disillusioned by the sociopolitical, and to some extent, economic conditions at home, making them more susceptible to the propaganda of radical Islam. ... Whereas Muslim immigrants in Europe have difficulty integrating into what is for them a very unfamiliar society, Muslims in Russia face serious difficulties at home. ... This is especially true in the North Caucasus, where most leaders are authoritarian, clans struggle dominance according to the principle of for my friends, everything - others, the law, and where nearly total corruption and impunity before the law characterize almost everyone with close ties to the ruling authorities. ... Such conditions cannot but generate feelings of frustration and protest, especially among young people. Until 2014, such youth would sometimes join the local underground, risking death if caught in one of the special operations the authorities regularly conduct, and automatically condemning their relatives to the black list on file with the local authorities. But now they can join ISIS in Syria or Iraq to fight Islamist-style justice. ... Radical Muslim recruiters are always ready to help them disappear quietly so as to escape notice by relatives and officials, often resurfacing later in a designated location and bearing a new name. As a result, their relatives, although troubled, live in relative safety because the young man in question did not join the underground. ... As the newly minted recruits, they gain experience in the global struggle as it unfolds in the Middle East, preparing them to later apply those deadly skills in their homeland. In other words, the North Caucasus underground is losing its potential recruits, rendering it less dangerous the local authorities. ... Human Rights Watch mentions another contributing factor - namely, the frequent use of unjustified and excessive force by Russian security forces in cleansing population centers in the North Caucasus. The destruction of homes, creation of special detention zones and torture described by human rights activists have prompted many young people to seek revenge. They either escape into the woods to prepare their militant return, or else join ISIS. ... Another method used finding recruits in Russia and Europe is to find young Muslims eager to learn more about their faith and gradually transform them from moderates into radicals. This is most often accomplished with the help of mentors who are either part of their social group or who correspond with them via the Internet. ... That is how Moscow State University student Varvara Karaulova ended up in Turkey on her way to joining ISIS when she was intercepted by that country's intelligence agencies. ... And although Russian intelligence agencies might find this type of recruit more or less understandable, there is a second type that is more perplexing and that poses a growing threat to Russia.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.003 | 0.002 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.001 | 0.004 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.003 | 0.002 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; both teacher heads agree on what is shown here.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".