Bibliographic record
Abstract
ion faite des souffrances humaines qu'elles engendrent, les armes nucleaires nous amenent, comme nous l'avons deja souligne, a un seuil critique. Elles ont la capacite de detruire l'ensemble de la civilisation tout ce qu'ont produit des milliers d'annees d'efforts dans les contextes culturels les plus divers. Sans doute ((l'evocation du triste sort de survivants affaiblis retombant dans l'abrutissement de l'âge de pierre n'est-elle pas une tâche qu'une personne douee de sensibilite entreprend volontiers», mais il faut savoir ((envisager avec lucidite l'issue probable de la voie sur laquelle est engagee l'humanite» 'O. Puisque les armes nucleaires sont capables de detruire toute vie sur la planete, elles mettent en peril toutes les aspirations de l'humanite au cours de son histoire, et l'humanite elle-meme. Hiroshima Diary: The Journal o f a Japanese Physician August 6-September 30, 1945, par Michihiko Hachiya, M.D., traduit et edite par Warner Wells, M.D., p. 14-15. 'O «The Medical and Ecological Effects of Nuclear War», par Don G. Bates, professeur d'histoire de la medecine, Universite McGill, dans McGill Law Journal, 1983, vol. 28, p. 717. An analogy may here be drawn between the law relating to the environment and the law relating to war. At one time it was thought that the atmosphere, the seas and the land surface of the planet were vast enough to absorb any degree of pollution and yet rehabilitate themselves. The law was consequently very lax in its attitude towards pollution. However, with the realization that a limit situation would soon be reached, beyond which the environment could absorb no further pollution without danger of collapse, the law found itself compelled to reorientate its attitude towards the environment. With the law of war, it is no different. Until the advent of nuclear war, it was thought that however massive the scale of a war, humanity could survive and reorder its affairs. With the nuclear weaDon. a limit situation . , was reached, in that the grim prospect opened out that humanity may well fail to survive the next nuclear war, or that al1 civilization may be destroyed. That limit situation has compelled the law of war to reorientate its attitudes and face this new reality. 8. Possession and Use Although it is the use of nuclear weapons, and not possession, that is the subject of this reference, many arguments have been addressed to the Court which deal with possession and which therefore are not pertinent to the issues before the Court. For example, the Court was referred, in support of the position that nuclear weapons are a matter within the sovereign authority of each State, to the following passage in Military and Paramilitary Activities ivl and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America) : 'in international law there are no rules, other than such rules as may be accepted by the State concerned, by treaty or otherwise, whereby the level of armaments of a sovereign State can be limited' (I.C. J. Reports 1986, p. 135) (CR95123, p. 79, France; emphasis added). passage clearly relates to possession, not use. Much was made also of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, as permitting nuclear weapons to the nuclear weapons States. Here again such permission, if any, as may be inferred from that treaty relates to possession and not use, for nowhere does the NPT contemplate or deal with the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. On questions of use or threat of use, the NPT is irrelevant. 9. Differing Attitudes of States Supporting Legality There are some significant differences between the positions adopted by States supporting the legality of the use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, in On peut ici faire un parallele entre le droit de l'environnement et le droit de la guerre. Il fut un temps ou l'atmosphere, les mers et la surface de la terre paraissaient suffisamment vastes pour supporter n'importe quel niveau de pollution et se regenerer en meme temps. Le droit etait donc tres tolerant visa-vis de la pollution. Mais lorsqu'on s'est rendu compte qu'un seuil critique allait bientot etre atteint au-dela duquel l'environnement ne serait plus capable de supporter de pollution sans risquer la destruction, le droit s'est trouve contraint de repenser son attitude vis-a-vis du phenomene. 11 en va de meme du droit de la guerre. Jusqu'a l'avenement de l'âge nucleaire, on pensait que l'humanite pouvait survivre a toute guerre, quelle qu'en fut l'ampleur, et retrouver son equilibre. Avec l'arme nucleaire, on a atteint un seuil critique avec l'apparition de la sinistre possibilite que l'humanite ne survive pas a la prochaine guerre nucleaire et que toute civilisation ne soit detruite. Le droit de la guerre s'est alors trouve contraint de revoir son attitude face a cette realite nouvelle. 8. Possession et utilisation Bien que ce soit l'utilisation et non la possession des armes nucleaires qui soit ici en cause, il a ete presente a la Cour de nombreux arguments qui ont trait a la possession et sont donc sans pertinence pour la question consideree. Un rappel a par exemple ete fait, a l'appui de la these selon laquelle le probleme des armes nucleaires releve de l'autorite souveraine de chaque Etat, du passage ci-apres de l'arret rendu dans l'affaire des Activites militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c. Etats-Unis d'Amerique) : «il n'existe pas en droit international de regles, autres que celles que 1'Etat interesse peut accepter, par traite ou autrement, imposant la limitation du niveau d'armement d'un Etat souverain)) (C. I. J. Recueil 1986, p. 135))) (CR95123, p. 79, France; les italiques sont de moi). Ce paragraphe concerne manifestement la detention, et non l'utilisation des armes en cause. On a, de meme, repete a satiete que le traite sur la non-proliferation n'interdit pas la possession des armes nucleaires aux Etats qui en sont dotes. Mais la encore, si on peut, a l'extreme rigueur, deduire de ce traite qu'il permet de posseder des armes nucleaires, on ne saurait l'interpreter comme autorisant l'emploi de ces armes puisqu'il ne s'applique en aucune maniere a l'emploi ou a la menace d'emploi des armes en question. S'agissant de ce probleme, le traite est depourvu de pertinence. 9. Positions differentes adoptees par les Etats favorables a la these de la liceite Il existe des differences notables dans les positions des Etats favorables a la these de la liceite de l'emploi des armes nucleaires. De fait, il y a, sur relation to some very basic matters, there are divergent approaches among the nuclear States themselves. Thus the French position is that This criterion of proportionality does not itself rule out in principle the utilization, whether in response or as a matter of first use, of any particular weapon whatsoever, including a nuclear weapon, provided that such use is intended to withstand an attack and appears to be the most appropriate means of doing SO. (French Written Statement, p. 29, emphasis added.) According to this view, the factors referred to could, in a given case, even outweigh the principle of proportionality. It suggests that the governing criterion determining the permissibility of the weapon is whether it is the most appropriate means of withstanding the attack. The United States position is that: Whether an attack with nuclear weapons would be disproportionate depends entirely on the circumstances, including the nature of the enemy threat, the importance of destroying the objective, the character, size and likely effects of the device, and the magnitude of therisk to (United States Written Statement, p. 23.) The United States position thus carefully takes into account such circumstances as the character, size and effects of the device and the magnitude of risk to civilians. The position of the Russian Federation is that the (see Section 111.4) is not working at al1 and that today the Martens Clause may formally be considered inapplicable (Written Statement, p. 13). The United Kingdom, on the other hand, while accepting the applicability of the Martens Clause, submits that the clause does not on its own establish the illegality of nuclear weapons (United Kingdom Written Statement, p. 48, para. 3.58). The United Kingdom argues that the terms of the Martens Clause make it necessary to point to a rule of customary law outlawing the use of nuclear weapons. These different perceptions of the scope, and indeed of the very basis of the claim of legality on the part of the nuclear powers themselves, cal1 for careful examination in the context of the question addressed to the
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".