Bibliographic record
Abstract
W Ad thy did India not sustain its trade liberalization after devaluing its currency in 1966? Exogenous shocks (such as wars and droughts) leading to balance of payments crises can generate the transition from import substitution (ISI) towards export promotion.' When governments do not have much foreign exchange left to pay for their imports, they need the help of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) since commercial lenders are not easily persuaded to lend to such risky customers. The classic dependence argument would suggest that dependence on the IMF for precious hard during a foreign exchange crisis should enable the IMF to dictate a policy of trade liberalization on the borrowers.2 The Indian devaluation of 1966 challenges this view of economic transition. India bowed to external pressure in the immediate aftermath of a severe foreign exchange crisis, a foray into liberalization that was short-lived, however, and India reverted back to an ever more stringent form of import substitution after 1969. 1 examine the political economy of a reversed liberalization in this paper. India's decision not to sustain liberalization after the initial 1966 rupee devaluation constitutes an important decision sequence in India's trade policy. It meant that India had decided to forego the growth opportunities provided by international trade that Europe, Japan, Taiwan and Korea had exploited so effectively. Second, for a student of political economy, it provides the insight that it is difficult to engineer economic transitions in developing countries as large and self-contained as India, purely on the basis of external pressure. This goes against the literature on economic transition that credits
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.004 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.004 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.004 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".