North Korea's Challenge of Regime Survival: Internal Problems and Implications for the Future
Bibliographic record
Abstract
T n he fall of the Soviet Union, German reunification, and China's embrace of capitalism have brought about neither the collapse of North Korea nor the end of the confrontation on the Korean peninsula, contrary to the predictions of many analysts who presumed that North Korea would not long survive the loss of its Communist allies without being forced to engage in economic and political reform. Yet almost a decade after the end of the cold war, North Korea has defied the natural laws of the politics of transition to the post-cold war era, clinging to survival and even finding limited support from an international community that fears the consequences of a shift away from the current status quo in the international relations of NortheastAsia towards an unpredictable, uncertain, and possibly unstable regional security environment. As time has passed, the choices have only grown more stark for North Korea and its neighbors: the Asian financial crisis underscored, for South Korean policy makers, the costs of instability in North Korea, yet it is equally clear that North Korea cannot recover economically without adjustment of Pyongyang's policies, although the argument has been made that North Korea's political leadership may be able to muddle through with only minor adjustments to the system.' However, recent progress in reducing interKorean tensions notwithstanding, there is the distinct possibility that the leadership in Pyongyang may eventually be faced with crises beyond its control, with spillover effects that would necessitate an international response to instability caused by the ultimate failure of North Korea's leadership to respond to the severe challenges it may face. Regardless of whether or not the North Korean leadership is able to muddle through with half-hearted adjustments to its current system or gain enough international food assistance and economic aid from the South to avoid the starkest possible choices, perceptions that the current regime in Pyongyang may not survive have already significantly influenced the policy
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".