Review: Essence of Indecision <i>Diefenbaker's Nuclear Policy</i>

ESSENCE OF INDECISION Diefenbaker's Nuclear Policy, 1957-1963 Patricia I. McMahon Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009. 246PP, $85.00 cloth ISBN 978-0-7735-3498-8Five decades after it took place, Canada's nuclear weapons debate of the late1950S and early 60s remains poorly understood. This is a consequence of several factors - the long-standing tendency of Canadian defence scholars and historians to turn their attention elsewhere, the fact that most Canadians have only a limited knowledge of their own history, and perhaps even the discouragement of this country's foreign policy elites (who might prefer that Canadians not know about this entire affair) - but the net result is that the debate and final decision remains a subject of study.Patricia I. McMahon's book, Essence of Indecision, is the most recent attempt to try to make sense of this episode. Building on a relatively smaU body of scholarship (perhaps the best known of which remains Jon McLin's seminal 1967 work Canada's Changing Defence Policy), McMahon chaUenges the consensus view by arguing that Prime Minister John was not indecisive in being unable to determine whether Canada should accept US nuclear weapons during his period in office. Rather, his inability to reach a final decision was the result of considerations. In particular, Diefenbaker's Conservatives were attempting to navigate government waters for the first time in decades, and the prime minister was acutely aware of the political consequences of making the wrong decision. At the same time, the government had come under withering criticism for its decisions on other defence issues (especially establishing NORAD in 1957-58 and cancelling the Avro Arrow in 1959), thereby making the nuclear weapons decision even more difficult.Without question, McMahon's task is not easy. As I and others have written, dithered for virtuaUy his entire tenure as prime minister. Even as his time in office was coming to an end in early 1963, he was still unable to articulate a clear position. His speech in January of that year - intended to clarify his thinking in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis - remains a masterpiece of double talk and obfuscation. During his six years in office, steadily moved from one side of the debate to the other. He spent his first four years laying the groundwork to accept nuclear weapons, but over the last two years of his term he did everything possible to ensure that Canada did not accept the weapons that he had previously said it would.The consensus view is that this change was the result of several factors, three of which stood out. First, appointed Howard Green - a man committed to disarmament - as secretary of state for external affairs in mid1959. Second, contrary to the opinion polls of the day, believed that the majority of Canadians opposed nuclear weapons, a condusion he reached largely by reading his personal mail. Finally, in this period arms control talks between the US and the USSR got underway, the goal of which was general and complete disarmament and an end to nudear testing.McMahon argues that these explanations are insufficient, and that to understand the delay one must first understand Diefenbaker's tenuous political position (even after winning an unprecedented majority in 1958). As the author notes in a critical passage, Diefenbaker feared the potential political fallout that could accompany the acquisition of nuclear weapons... [and this] is what lent an air of indecision to his behaviour (x). According to McMahon, Diefenbaker's delay was understandable, and his recognition of the political risks that nuclear acquisition entailed largely explains his difficulty in coming to a final decision.McMahon insists that always wanted Canada to acquire the weapons, but the timing was never right. …

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