The embryo as person.

In order to determine the human rights of the embryo, we must first determine whether or not it is a person. Certainly, it does not look like a person when its life begins, or in the first stages of it existence. But in its genetic makeup, it has the active potency that enables it to develop the characteristics that we associate with personhood. The modern concept of personhood, following the thought of John Locke, focuses upon consciousness as the essence of personhood. Modern philosophers believe that consciousness is acquired over time, and is at times latent. Thus the concept of potency is not foreign to modern thought concerning personhood. There are many bioethicists who admit that the embryo or zygote is a living being, but they are not willing to affirm that it is a human being at the time of its formation. An analysis of their arguments results in an affirmation that the embryo is a person in the sense indicated above. While the Church has not stated definitely that the embryo is a human person, it has affirmed the need to respect it as such. Maintaining that human life begins at fertilization does not imply that human life is an absolute good. Is the human embryo a person? The answer to this question is found in the sciences of biology and philosophy, but for practical purposes, the answer has significant implications for human rights. If the human embryo is not a person, then it would not seem to have any rights. In that case, human embryos could be subjected, without opposition, to research and experimentation that might result in their destruction. If the embryo is a human person, what rights does it have? Embryos, even though they are self-directed, do not exist as autonomous organisms. They are subject to the care of other people. What is the responsibility of individuals who 282 Life and Learning XVI There is no dearth of literature in regard to the question of the embryo as a 1 human person. A few of the relevant articles by scholars in the Catholic tradition are Dianne Nutwell Irving, Philosophical and Scientific Analysis of the Nature of the Human Embryo, Ph.D. dissertation (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University, 1991); Benedict Ashley, O.P., “A Critique of the Theory of Delayed Hominization” in An Ethical Evaluation of Fetal Experimentation, eds. Donald G. McCarthy and Albert S. Moraczewski, O.P. (St. Louis MO: Pope John XXIII Center, 1976); Benedict Ashley, O.P., “When Does a Human Person Begin to Exist” in Collected Essays (Naples FL: Ave Maria University Press, forthcoming); J. Bracken, “Is the Early Embryo a Person?” Linacre Qiarterly 68/1 (2001): 49-70; Jason Eberl, “The Beginning of Personhood: A Thomistic Biological Analysis,” Bioethics 14/2 (2000): 135-51; N. Ford, When Did I Begin? Conception of the Human Person in History, Philosophy, and Science (New York NY: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988); J. Donceel, “Immediate Animation and Delayed Hominization,” Theological Studies 31/1 (1970): 76-105; T. Shannon and A. Wolter, “Reflections on the Moral Status of the Embryo,” Theological Studies 51/4 (1990): 603-26; P. Smith, “The Beginning of Personhood, A Thomistic Perspective,” Laval Revue Theologique et Philosophique 39/2 (1983): 197; S. Heaney, “Aquinas and the Presence of the Human Rational Soul in the Early Embryo,” The Thomist 56/1 (1992): 19-48. care for a human embryo? What is the responsibility of the community to make it possible for the human embryo to survive and flourish? If the human embryo is not a person at the first stages of its existence, it seems necessary to determine when it is endowed with humanity; at what stage of its existence can we predicate personhood? In order to consider this question adequately, we shall depend on the biology of human development and the concept of person as it has been utilized through the ages. Hence, we shall consider (1) the meaning of the term person, (2) whether the human embryo fits into the category of person, and (3) the implications of the foregoing considerations. Before proceeding to these considerations, however, we must consider the concept of potency, because it is fundamental for our considerations. Note on Potency In the philosophical construct that we shall be using in this presentation, all reality is divided into act and potency. A being-in-act exists here and now. Things exist in act as substance or as accidents inhering in substances. Thomists speak of a substance as being in first or second act. Kevin D. O’Rourke, O.P. 283 Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae I.76.4 ad 1; Heaney, p. 36; Bracken, p. 62. 2 F. Wade, “Potentiality in the Abortion Discussion,” Review of Metaphysics 29 3 (1975): 39-55. For a discussion of passive and active potentiality using the human sperm as an example, see Eberl, p. 152. That is, a substance exists (first act) and performs actions in accord with its nature (second act). A being-in-potency is not in act here and now, but 2 has the intrinsic capacity to be rendered into act, that is, to become what it is not here and now. There are various modes of being-in-potency. Passive potency means that an agent may be rendered into act by another being-in-act. For example, a pale man has the potency to become tan by exposure to the sun. Before exposure to the sun, he was not tan, but he had the potency to acquire this quality. Active potency implies that a being-in-act has the capacity to become something else, or to act in a different manner, by reason of its own power. The agent goes from not acting to acting. Experience teaches that beings act in accord with their nature (operatio sequitur esse). An active potency may be remote or proximate, depending on the stage of development of the being with the potency. A rose bush has the potency to bloom and produce flowers; in the winter this potency is remote, but in the spring this potency is proximate. A grain of corn has the potency to grow into a large stalk of corn, given the proper environmental conditions – but not the potency to grow into an oak tree. When it is still a grain of corn, it does not look like the large stalk that it has the potency to become. The concept of potency enables us to explain changes in a being when we know that the subject under consideration remains the same, even though appearances change. Moreover, the concept of active potency is significant in the discussion of the embryo as person. Certainly, an embryo does not look or act like the entity that we usually refer to as a person. But as we shall see, it does have the active potency to develop into a mature adult, the entity that we usually refer to as a person. WHAT IS A PERSON? In Catholic philosophical and theological considerations, the definition 284 Life and Learning XVI Boethius, De duabus naturis §3, in J.-P. Migne, Patrologia Latina, vol. 64, p. 4 1343. Aquinas, Summa theologiae I.29.1. 5

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