The Well-being Conception of Health and the Conflation Problem
Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Human rights advocates often use inflated and thus underspecified terminologies when addressing the content of their claims.One example of such loose terminology is the term 'well-being', as currently employed in connection with a definition for the right to health.What I call the 'well-being conception of health' conflates the distinct ideas of basic and non-basic health needs, as well as those of individual autonomy and freedom.I call this the conflation problem.This paper argues for the need of an understanding of the right to health, nuanced enough to capture not only these distinct ideas, but also their moral relevance for the common good.keywords right to health, well-being, basic health needs, autonomy, freedom Documents from both the World Health Organization (WHO) and United Nations (UN) equate 'health' to 'well-being', and set the conventional understanding of a 'right to health' as 'the right of everyone to the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health' (International Covenant Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966).I call this the well-being conception of health, and I here argue against it.Health is but one aspect of a person's overall well-being (Fisher and Gormally 2001).In failing to recognize this, the conventional definition of a right to health is not able to capture certain distinctions that are crucial not only for certain bioethical debates involving the need to define priorities in healthcare resource allocation, but also for the deliberation and crafting of reasonable legislations and policies addressing the reality of scarce resources.This paper looks at two examples of those overlooked distinctions, namely the distinction between the ideas of basic and non-basic health needs and between the ideas of individual autonomy and freedom.The conventional definition of a right
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.004 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it