La Place Des Cultures Juridiques Et Des Langues Autochtones Dans Les Accords D’Autonomie Gouvernementale AU Canada (Aboriginal Legal Cultures and Languages in Self-Governance Agreements in Canada)
Bibliographic record
Abstract
French Abstract: Au cours de la derniere decennie, les gouvernements federal et provinciaux ont conclu trois accords ayant valeur de traite avec les Nisga’a, les Tlicho et les Inuits du Labrador. Ces accords mettent notamment en place de nouvelles institutions gouvernementales autochtones. Cet article etudie la place que ces trois accords octroient aux cultures juridiques et aux langues autochtones dans la production et la diffusion du droit. L’auteur conclut que seul l’Accord inuit manifeste une ouverture audacieuse aux cultures juridiques autochtones et en particulier a la coutume comme source extra-etatique de droit.L’auteur constate egalement que les juridictions autochtones creees par les accords sont etroitement alignees sur le modele etatique du point de vue de leur fonctionnement et entierement integrees a la hierarchie judiciaire etatique. Par consequent, en l’absence d’un veritable pluralisme judiciaire, l’auteur estime qu’il n’existe pas de garantie que les juges charges de dire le droit autochtone exercent leurs fonctions dans le respect des cultures juridiques autochtones.Par ailleurs, apres des siecles de repression et de declin des langues autochtones, celles-ci sont reconnues par les accords et les constitutions autochtones comme de veritables langues juridiques aptes a jouer un role de premier ordre dans la production et la diffusion du droit autochtone. Ces langues restent toutefois subordonnees a l’anglais, qui demeure la langue preeminente d’interpretation des traites et des lois fondamentales autochtones.Au final, a l’exception de l’Accord inuit, les accords etudies dans cet article n’expriment pas une tres grande ouverture formelle a la diversite juridique dans la gouvernance autochtone. Il ne faut toutefois pas sous-estimer la resilience des cultures juridiques autochtones et la capacite des peuples autochtones d’en faire une source materielle du droit pour les nouvelles entites gouvernementales.English Abstract: Over the course of the last decade, the federal and provincial governments concluded three self-government agreements with the Nisga’a, the Tlicho, and the Labrador Inuit. These agreements notably establish new Aboriginal government institutions. This article studies the role that these three agreements accord to legal culture and Aboriginal languages in the creation and diffusion of law. The author concludes that only the Inuit Agreement manifests an audacious openness towards Aboriginal legal cultures, and in particular towards custom as a non-state source of law.The author observes that the Aboriginal jurisdictions created by the agreements are closely aligned with the state model in terms of their functioning, and are entirely integrated in the judicial hierarchy of the state. As a consequence, in the absence of true legal pluralism, the author believes that there is no guarantee that the judges charged with articulating Aboriginal law will exercise their functions with respect for Aboriginal legal cultures.After suffering decades of repression and decline, Aboriginal languages have received recognition in these self-government agreements and in Aboriginal constitutions as legal languages able to play a role of the highest order in the creation and diffusion of Aboriginal law. However, Aboriginal languages are subordinated to English, which remains the primary language of interpretation of the agreements and fundamental Aboriginal laws.Finally, with the exception of the Inuit Agreement, the agreements studied in this article do not express a strong formal openness to legal diversity in Aboriginal governance. In spite of this, the resilience of Aboriginal legal cultures and the capacity of Aboriginal peoples to use these agreements as an interpretive source of law for future government entities must not be underestimated.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.011 | 0.006 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.004 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.004 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".