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Record W236053793

Public Sector Reform and the State: The Case of China

2001· article· en· W236053793 on OpenAlexaboutno aff
John P. Burns

Bibliographic record

VenuePublic Administration Quarterly · 2001
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicSocial Policy and Reform Studies
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsMarketizationDeregulationPublic sectorChinaDecentralizationPrivate sectorMarket economyBusinessGovernment (linguistics)EconomicsEconomic policyEconomic growthEconomyPolitical science
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

ABSTRACT Administrative reform in China has followed a different path from reform in OECD countries. Because of its different point of departure (relatively underdeveloped, centrally planned economy, and one party monopoly) reform in China has included establishing a market economy, strengthening market regulations, and institutionalizing civil service. There are some similarities between China and OECD countries, however. Both China and developed capitalist democracies have tried to downsize their public sectors, corporatize some government departments, and decentralize administration. Contrary to stated policy goals of Chinese government, net result of these changes has been to strengthen state. Moreover, reform has left both developmental and predatory natures of Chinese state intact. There is some evidence, however, that Chinese state is now seeking to become more neutral vis-a-vis INTRODUCTION Spared by economic crises and informed by New Right, public-sector reform in developed capitalist democracies has involved decentralization, deregulation, privatization, and marketization (Lane, 1997:1; Rainey, 1998: 19; Hood, 1991). The implication of these changes was that size and role of state would shrink. According to this scenario, a lean core state would remain to manage most activities indirectly. Most public goods and services would be provided by business-like executive agencies or by private sector and non-profit organizations under contract. Globalization and need to compete in an increasingly integrated market have had an impact on developing countries as well and they, too, have been encouraged to reform their public sectors. Because China has come to public sector reform from a radically different starting point from developed capitalist democracies (relatively underdeveloped, centrally planned, and ruled by a one-party monopoly), reform in world's most populous country has taken its own path. Still, reform in China has also sought a smaller, less intrusive state. This goal is neatly captured in official Chinese slogan: small government, large society. The evidence now indicates, however, that in spite if years of reform both in China and overseas, position of state remains relatively strong. The statist orientation of public-sector reform is evident in western democracies. In OECD countries, for example, although size of civil service has shrunk in many cases (including Australia, Canada, New Zealand, UK, and USA), public expenditure as a percentage of gross national product has remained remarkably stable (Ferlie et al. 1996:2-3) because the public sector continues to finance and deliver core goods and services that are of major significance to as a whole: health, education, research and development, criminal justice, and social security (Ibid., 3). In China, case is even clearer. Not only has size of public sector, especially government, been immune to years of attempted downsizing but also position of state as a result of public sector reform, especially local state, remains as strong as ever. The goal of small government, large society has yet to be realized. CONTEXT China is divided into 30 provinces or provincial-level units ranging in population from 2 million (Tibet) to over 110 million (Sichuan) people. Average provincial population is 30 to 40 million, larger than population of many countries. Provinces are subdivided into prefectures (there were 110 such units by end of 1997) or prefectural cities (22 in 1997). Prefectures in turn are subdivided into counties (1,693 in 1997) or county-level cities (442). Cities are further divided into 727 districts (State Statistical Bureau, 1998:3). Territorially based party committees, each with its own bureaucracy, manage government and economy at each administrative level (Lieberthal, 1995). …

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.002
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.002
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Qualitative · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.282
Threshold uncertainty score0.560

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0020.002
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.001
Bibliometrics0.0010.002
Science and technology studies0.0140.012
Scholarly communication0.0060.003
Open science0.0010.005
Research integrity0.0040.004
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0060.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.045
GPT teacher head0.320
Teacher spread0.275 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designQualitative
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations25
Published2001
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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