Pengaruh Good Corporate Governance dan Tingkat Disclosure terhadap Biaya Utang dan Biaya Ekuitas (Studi empiris pada perusahaan manufaktur yang terdaftar di BEI periode 2012-2014)
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Bibliographic record
Abstract
Tujuan dari penelitian ini adalah untuk menganalisis dan memperoleh bukti empiris terkait pengaruh Pengaruh Good Corporate Governance dan Tingkat Disclosure Terhadap Baiya Utang dan Biaya Ekuitas. Proksi dari Good Corporate Governance adalah Kepemilikan Keluarga, Kepemilikan Manajerial, Kepemilikan Institusional, dan Kualitas Audit. Penelitian ini merupakan penelitian kuantatif dengan pendekatan deskriptif menggunakan metode penelitian studi empiris. Objek penelitian ini adalah seluruh perusahaan perbankan yang listed dan go public di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) tahun 2012-2014. Penentuan sampel dalam penelitian ini menggunakan metode purposive sampling , sehingga diperoleh sampel sebanyak 35 perusahaan perbankan selama tiga tahun periode penelitian. Pengujian hipotesis menggunakan analisis regresi linear berganda. Hasil pengujian menunjukkan bahwa kepemilikan keluarga, kepemilikan manajerial, dan tingkat disclosure tidak berpengaruh terhadap biaya utang. Kepemilikan institusional dan kualitas audit berpengaruh terhadap biaya utang. Sedangkan kepemilikan keluarga, kepemilikan manajerial, kepemilikan institusional dan tingkat disclosure tidak berpengaruh terhadap biaya ekuitas. Sedangkan kualitas audit berpengaruh terhadap biaya ekuitas. Saran untuk penelitian selanjutnya dapat menggunakan proksi lain dalam menghitung biaya utang dan biaya ekuitas. Kata kunci: Good Corporate Governance , Kepemilikan Keluarga, Kepemilikan Manajerial, Kepemilikan Institusional, Kualitas Audit, Tingkat Disclosure, Biaya Utang, Biaya Ekuitas. The purpose of this study was to analyze and obtain empirical evidence related to the Influence of Good Corporate Governance and Disclosure Levels on Cost of Debt and Cost of Equity. Proxy of Good Corporate Governance is a Family Ownership, Managerial Ownership, Institutional Ownership and Quality Audit. This research is descriptive quantitative approach using empirical study method. The object of this study is the entire manufacture companies listed and publicly traded on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) in 2012-2014. The samples in this study using purposive sampling method, in order to obtain a sample of 35 manufacturing companies during the three years of the study period. Hypothesis testing using multiple linear regression analysis. The test results show that family ownership, managerial ownership, and the level of disclosure does not affect the cost of debt. Institutional ownership and audit quality affect the cost of debt. While the family ownership, managerial ownership, institutional ownership and the level of disclosure does not affect the cost of equity. While audit quality affect the cost of equity. Suggestions for further research can use another proxy in calculating the cost of debt and cost of equity. Keyword : Family Ownership, Managerial Ownership, Institutional Ownership , Quality Audit , Disclosure Levels , Cost of Debt, Cost of Equity DAFTAR PUSTAKA Asbaugh, H., D.W.Collins, & R. LaFond. (2004). Corporate governance and the cost of equity capital . Working paper, University of Wisconsin. Ayub, Maydeliana. (2008). “Pengaruh Family Owndership Terhadap Cost of Debt . Tesis: FEUI. Bloomfield, R. J., & Wilks, T. J. (2000), “Disclosure Effects in the Laboratory : Liquidity, Depth and the Cost of capital”, The Accounting Review, vol. 75 (1) , hal. 13-41. Chalmers, J. M. R., & Angela Gore. (2001 ), Mandatory Municipal Disclosure Requirements:Are There Benefit? . http://Icb1.uoregon.edu/agore/research/. (24 Januari 2002). Dyck, A., & L. Zingales. (2004). “Control Premiums And The Effectiveness of Corporate Governance Systems . Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 16, 51-72. Francis, J.R., K.I. Khurana, & R. Pereira. (2005). Disclosure incentives and effects on cost of capital around the world . The Accounting Review, 80(4), 1125-1162. Guedhami, O. & D. Mishra. (2006). Excess control, corporate governance, and implied cost of equity: An international evidence . Canada: University of Newfoundland. Gunarsih, T. (2003). Riset Empiris dalam Corporate Governance . Seminar sehari: Issues Application & Research In Corporate Governance dalam Rangka Launching Pusat Studi Corporate Governance . FE UTY. Hadiprajitno, P. B. (2013). Struktur Kepemilikan, Mekanisme Tata Kelola Perusahaan, dan Biaya Keagenan di Indonesia (Studi Empiris pada Perusahaan di Bursa Efek Indonesia. J Akuntansi dan Auditing, 9 (2), 97-127. Hail, L. (2001), The Impact of Voluntary Corporate Disclosure on The Ex ante Cost of Capital – A Swiss Point of View. http://helious.unive.it/~bauhaus/. (Februari 2001) Imam, Ghozali. (2006). Aplikasi Analisis Multivariate dengan Program SPSS Cetakan IV . Semarang: Badan Penerbit Univeristas Diponegoro Jensen, M. C. & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of The Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics , 3, 305-360. Jensen, M. (1993). The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems . Journal of Finance 48: 831-880. Juniarti & A. A. Sentosa. (2009). Pengaruh Good Corporate Governance, Voluntary Disclosure terhadap Biaya Utang (Cost of Debt) . Jurnal Akuntansi Keuangan, Vol. 11, No. 2, November, 88-100. Komalasari, P. T., & Zaki Baridwan. (2001), “Asimetri Informasi dan Cost of equity capital”, Jurnal Riset Akuntansi Indonesia, vol. 1 (4), hal. 64-81. Komite Nasional Kebijakan Governance. (2006). “Pedoman Pembentukan Komite Audit yang Efektif. Jakarta: Komite Nasional Kebejikan Governance. Leuz, C., & Robert E. Verrecchia. (2000). “The Economic Consequences of Increased Disclosure”, Journal of Accounting Research, vol. 38 , hal. 91-124. Levinsohn, A. (2001), “FASB Weigh the Value of Voluntary Disclosure”, Strategic Finance (NAA), vol. 82. (9), Hal 73. Larasati, & Eva. (2011). Pengaruh Kepemilikan Manajerial, Kepemilikan Institusional dan Kebijakan Dividen terhadap Kebijakan Hutang Perusahaan, Jurnal Ekonomi Bisnis , Th. 16, No.2. Natalia, Dessy & Yen Sun. (2013). “Analisis Pengaruh Wajibnya Penerapan Good Corporate Governance Terhadap Biaya Ekuitas Pada Badan Usaha Milik Negara Yang Terdaftar Di Bursa Efek Indonesia Tahun 2009-2012”. Skripsi: Bina Nusantara. Nuringsih, & Kartika. (2010). Pengaruh Profitabilitas, Kebijakan Hutang dan Kepemilikan Institusional Terhadap Kepemilikan Manajerial dan Pengaruhnya Terhadap Risiko. Jurnal Bisnis dan Akuntansi , Vol.12, No.1, pp. 17-28 Piot, C., & F.M. Piera. (2007). Corporate Governance, Audit Quality, and The Cost of Debt Financing of French Listed Companies . Working Paper http;//ssrn.com. Rebecca & Yulisa. (2012). “Pengaruh Corporate Governance Index , Kepemilikan Keluarga, dan Kepemilikan Institusional Terhadap Biaya Ekuitas dan Biaya Ricky, D, & W. Meiranto. (2014). “ Pengaruh Good Corporate Governance Terhadap Biaya Ekuitas dan Biaya Utang: Studi Empiris Pada Perusahaan Manufaktur Yang Terdaftar di BEI pada tahun ” . Jurnal Riset Akuntansi Indonesia, vol. 3, No 3, hal. 1-12. Shuto, A., & N. Kitagawa. (2010). The effect of managerial ownership on the cost of debt: Evidence from Japan . RIEB Discussion Paper Series, Kobe University. Shleifer, A. & R.W. Vishny. (1997). A survey of corporate governance . Journal of Finance 52, 737–783. Stanko, B. B. (2001), “ Improving Financial Reporting and Disclosure ”, Business and Economic Review (BER) vol. 47 (4). hal. 21.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.001 | 0.007 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.002 | 0.002 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it