The principle of compensation in relation to public interference in the real property market : an interface of law and economics
Bibliographic record
Abstract
The objective of this thesis is to examine the principle of compensation in relation to public interferences in the real property market. Public activities in the real property market frequently have the effects of incurring losses to be suffered by some individuals in society and gains to be enjoyed by others. One crucial problem is how we should draw the line between compensable losses and non-compensable losses. In-order to determine the criteria of compensability, we have resorted to economic principles as well as legal rules. Economic principles are relevant because the losses (caused by public activities) that we are interested in are economic losses. Legal rules are also relevant because courts have often been left with the responsibility of determining fair compensation. As far as legal rules are concerned, we recognize three legal rules that have been developed from judicial decisions and legal commentary, and have been deemed to be critical in determining the criteria of compensability. We evaluate these three rules against the economic principles of allocative efficiency and the principles of justice developed by John Rawls, and we have come to the conclusion that these three rules have inherent weaknesses in determining how we should draw the line between compensable and non-compensable losses. However, these three legal rules have considerable influence on judicial decisions with respect to the provision of compensation caused by the following three types of public interferences, namely, compulsory acquisition of land, injurious affection on land, and planning restrictions of land use. Consequently, the provision of compensation under each of the above three occassions for compensation have frequently been unsatisfactory and inadequate. We have also examined recent legislative reforms in Canada, and we have noted certain welcoming changes in statutory law and have also pointed out some other areas where further reforms are required.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.010 | 0.010 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.004 | 0.035 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.010 | 0.012 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.004 |
| Research integrity | 0.006 | 0.007 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.004 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".