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Record W2462937133 · doi:10.1108/jfc-03-2015-0012

Agency theory and financial crime: the paradox of the opportunistic executive

2016· article· en· W2462937133 on OpenAlexaff
Michel Dion

Bibliographic record

VenueJournal of Financial Crime · 2016
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicLaw, Economics, and Judicial Systems
Canadian institutionsUniversité de Sherbrooke
Fundersnot available
KeywordsOpportunismEthical egoismPrudenceAgency (philosophy)Corporate governanceLaw and economicsPositive economicsEconomicsEpistemologyPolitical scienceLawManagementPhilosophy

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to philosophically address the issue of managerial opportunism and to describe the paradox of the opportunistic executive, particularly when the CEO could be considered as a “criminal-to-be”. Design/methodology/approach It will be seen to what extent governance mechanisms really contribute to prevent managerial opportunism, particularly through compensation packages (“financial carrots”). Then, Oliver E. Williamson’s viewpoint will be analyzed on opportunism, as his theory has largely influenced the way agency theories actually define managerial opportunism. Williamson was thinking opportunism without referring to philosophical works. The gap in exploring three basic types of opportunism will be filled: the Smithian egoist, the Hobbesian egoist and the Machiavellian egoist. Findings The Smithian egoist tries to reach an equilibrium between self-interest and compassion, while the Hobbesian egoist is motivated by self-interest, desire of power and the attitude of prudence. The Machiavellian egoist is always searching for power and makes followers’ fear arising. The way governance mechanisms and structures should be designed and implemented could be quite different if the CEO actually behaves as a Smithian, Hobbesian or Machiavellian egoist. CEO’s propensity to commit financial crime could largely vary from one type to another: low risk (Smithian egoist), medium risk (Hobbesian egoist) or high risk (Machiavellian egoist). Research limitation/implications Smith’s, Hobbes’ and Machiavelli’s philosophy was chosen because the agency theory sometimes refers to it, when defining the notion of opportunism. Other philosophies could also be analyzed to see to what extent they are opening the door to opportunism (for example, Spinoza). Originality/value The paper analyzes managerial opportunism from a philosophical viewpoint. Whether executives are Smithian, Hobbesian or Machiavellian egoists, their opportunism cannot give birth to similar behaviors.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.007
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.014
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.007
Threshold uncertainty score0.038

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0070.014
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0020.001
Science and technology studies0.0040.023
Scholarly communication0.0050.006
Open science0.0010.003
Research integrity0.0020.003
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0030.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.031
GPT teacher head0.227
Teacher spread0.196 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations9
Published2016
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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