The social dimension of belief in conspiracy theories
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Belief in conspiracy theories is a widespread societal phenomenon. For instance, in 2004, according to a Zogby International poll, 49% of New York City residents believed that the US government knew in advance that the 9/11 terrorist strikes were coming and consciously failed to act. Moreover, 22% of Canadian citizens in 2006 believed that Al-Qaeda had little or nothing to do with the 9/11 terrorist strikes (for details, see Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009). Likewise, in 1963 about two-thirds of US citizens believed in a conspiracy theory regarding the John F. Kennedy assassination, a figure that was still as high as 56% in 1991 (Pipes, 1997, p. 15). These statistics underscore that belief in conspiracy theories is not a trivial phenomenon that is exclusive to a few pathological individuals, but instead deserves the serious research attention of the social sciences (see also Robins and Post, 1999). In the present contribution, we define belief in conspiracy theories as explanatory beliefs about a number of actors who join together in secret agreement, and try to achieve a hidden goal which is perceived as unlawful or malevolent (Zonis and Joseph, 1994, pp. 448–9). One of the main research findings on this phenomenon is that conspiracy beliefs are monological in nature: One conspiracy theory reinforces other conspirational ideas, making individuals who believe in one conspiracy theory more likely to also believe in other conspiracy theories (Goertzel, 1994; Lewandowski, Oberauer, and Gignac, 2013; Swami, Coles, Stieger et al., 2011). A recent study reveals that this monological belief system even applies to conspiracy theories that are mutually exclusive: For instance, beliefs that Princess Diana staged her own death are positively correlated with beliefs that Princess Diana was assassinated (Wood, Douglas, and Sutton, 2012).
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.003 | 0.011 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.003 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.011 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.003 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.004 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".