Bibliographic record
Abstract
‘[I]f LAW be a science ’, said Sir William Jones in 1781, ‘and really deserve so sublime a name, it must be founded on principle, and claim an exalted rank in the empire of reason ’. In Goodisson v . Nunn (1792), Lord Kenyon, in dealing with the then very controversial question of when contractual covenants were to be considered independent of each other, was faced with old cases apparently requiring a result that he thought was unjust. He was able to find that the old cases had impliedly been overruled by more recent cases: The old cases…have been accurately stated, but the determinations in them outrage common sense…I am glad to find that the old cases have been over-ruled; and that we are now warranted by precedent as well as by principle to say this action cannot be maintained. These two statements, eleven years apart, invite comparison. Both appeal to ‘principle’, but the word is used with different connotations. Jones spoke of principle as an essential component of the claim of the law – a claim of which Jones evidently approved – to be a rational science. There is no explicit place in this concept for individual judgment on the part of judges or of writers of what legal rules would, on general considerations, be beneficial or desirable in the interests of justice to the parties to a particular dispute or in the interests of society at large in the future. Lord Kenyon, on the other hand, though he also concludes his statement with an appeal to ‘principle’, was evidently motivated by a desire to avoid injustice to the defendant in the particular case, and to establish a rule that would, in his judgment, be beneficial in future cases. Personal opinion was engaged, as is shown by the use of the very strong phrase in reference to the old cases, that they ‘outrage common sense’, and in the next words, ‘I am glad to find that the old cases have been over-ruled’.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.011 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.005 | 0.007 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.003 | 0.005 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.012 | 0.003 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".