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Record W2483418056 · doi:10.1017/ccol0521570069.004

Reflections on Inquiry and Truth Arising from Peirce's Method for the Fixation of Belief

2004· book-chapter· en· W2483418056 on OpenAlexaff
David Wiggins

Bibliographic record

VenueCambridge University Press eBooks · 2004
Typebook-chapter
Languageen
FieldArts and Humanities
TopicPragmatism in Philosophy and Education
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Toronto
Fundersnot available
KeywordsPragmatismPropositionEpistemologyPragmatic theory of truthCoherence theory of truthSettlement (finance)Action (physics)PsychologyPhilosophyComputer science

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

My paper of November 1877, setting out from the proposition that the agitation of a question ceases when satisfaction is attained with the settlement of belief. . . goes on to consider how the conception of truth gradually develops from that principle under the action of experience, beginning with willful belief or self-mendacity, the most degraded of all mental conditions; thence arising to the imposition of beliefs by the authority of organized society; then to the idea of settlement of opinion as the result of fermentation of ideas; and finally reaching the idea of truth as overwhelmingly forced upon the mind in experiences as the effect of an independent reality. CP 5.564, “Basis of Pragmatism.” 1906. (italics not in original) The third philosophical stratagem for cutting off inquiry consists in maintaining that this, that, or the other element of science is basic, ultimate, independent of aught else, and utterly inexplicable – not so much from any defect in our knowing as because there is nothing beneath it to know. The only type of reasoning by which such a conclusion could possibly be reached is retroduction . Now nothing justifies a retroductive inference except its affording an explanation of the facts. It is, however, no explanation at all of a fact to pronounce it inexplicable . That, therefore, is a conclusion which no reasoning can ever justify or excuse. CP 1.139 “The First Rule of Logic.” 1899 Abduction consists in studying facts and devising a theory to explain them. Its only justification is that, if we are ever to understand things at all, it must be in that way. CP 5.145 “Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism.” 1903 [Scientific procedure] will at times find a high probability established by a single confimatory instance, while at others it will dismiss a thousand as almost worthless. Frege 1884: 16 “The Fixation of Belief” was published in 1877 as a popular essay. But Peirce must have attributed to it not simply the literary felicity that we find in it, but high philosophical importance. For in the ensuing decades he constantly returned to this paper as a focus for the clarification of his thoughts, either entering corrections and amplifications or else adapting it to new philosophical initiatives. Some of the amendments were designed to adjust the essay to the projects of “The Grand Logic” and “The Search for a Method.”

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.015
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.020
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Other · Consensus signal: Other
Teacher disagreement score0.015
Threshold uncertainty score0.089

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0150.020
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0040.002
Science and technology studies0.0050.064
Scholarly communication0.0080.013
Open science0.0020.005
Research integrity0.0040.011
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0040.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.116
GPT teacher head0.294
Teacher spread0.178 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreOther

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations56
Published2004
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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