Crimes against Information Security: International Legal Aspects of Fighting and Experience of Some States
Why this work is in the frame
A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.
Bibliographic record
Abstract
This article is devoted to the study of foreign criminal law providing for liability for information security offences. The relevance of that problem is driven by the intensifying IT development and globalization, under which both information security of a separate state and international information security may not be achieved by the efforts of a single state. Efforts need to be consolidated, and a uniform approach to the solution of that matter needs to be worked out. The author stresses that in the Russian Federation and in most foreign countries there is no systematic approach to criminal law protection of information security except for the Republic of Poland. In most foreign criminal codes JIBC April 2016, Vol. 21, No.S3 - 2 - (CC), the provisions on information security protection are spread all over Special parts. In most foreign countries, offences against confidentiality of professional and official secrets are criminalized, while in the Civil Code of the RF such provisions are missing. Meantime, foreign criminal law does not specify separate elements of crimes in order to protect tax secrets. Criminal law protection of state secret is solved differently in foreign countries: via detailed regulation for state secret offences and under totally missing respective provisions in CC. Regarding cybercrime, the CIS countries used to apply the uniform approach to criminalization of respective elements of crime as criminal laws of most of them adopted the provisions of Model Criminal Code of the CIS member states. However, in future, due to the amendments of articles providing for liability for cybercrime that approach was lost. In foreign countries, along with the traditional illegal access to computer information, the liability is provided for computer sabotage, computer fraud. The author opines that a systematic approach is required to criminal law protection both in the Russian Federation and in foreign countries. Only uniform, joint, consolidated acts may efficiently serve to fight information security offences.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it