MétaCan
Menu
Back to cohort
Record W249554062

Judicialization and Globalization in the North American Free Trade Agreement

2003· article· en· W249554062 on OpenAlexaboutno aff
Patricia Isela Hansen

Bibliographic record

VenueTexas international law journal · 2003
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldBusiness, Management and Accounting
TopicInternational Arbitration and Investment Law
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsInternational tradeGlobalizationFree tradeEuropean unionPolitical scienceCommissionLegislatureLawEconomics
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

I. INTRODUCTION The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) creates a new set of international tribunals with significant powers in areas traditionally reserved to domestic law. However, the experience under NAFTA has been one of globalization with only limited judicialization. The international tribunals created by NAFTA display significant differences from tribunals established under other agreements, including the European Union, and even the World Trade Organization. Moreover, although NAFTA has certainly aroused considerable interest in the judiciaries of the three NAFTA countries, each country has adopted provisions designed to limit the role of domestic courts in interpreting and applying that agreement. Significant questions are now being raised about the extent of these limits. NAFTA was ratified by the United States, Canada, and Mexico in 1993, in order to promote trade and investment between these three countries.1 However, in contrast with the European Union, NAFTA is not a customs union, does not provide for the free movement of persons, and does not create any significant institutional infrastructure. Responsibility for implementing the agreement lies with the Free Trade Commission, which consists of cabinet-level representatives of the parties or their designees.2 Although the Commission is assisted by a secretariat, the secretariat actually consists of separate national Sections in each of the NAFTA countries.3 NAFTA does not create any legislative or institutions. However, it does establish three separate mechanisms for the resolution of disputes by international tribunals: a general mechanism for resolution of disputes between the NAFTA countries;4 a special mechanism replacing review of national decisions regarding antidumping and countervailing duties; and a third mechanism allowing NAFTA citizens that invest in other NAFTA countries to submit claims for monetary damages against their host government to binding arbitration.6 Additional dispute settlement mechanisms are set forth in two side agreements environmental and labor issues. However, my remarks will focus only the provisions set forth in NAFTA itself.7 II. NAFTA's GENERAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT PROVISIONS NAFTA's general dispute settlement procedures resemble those of the 1947 General Agreement Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in that participation is limited to states that are parties to the agreement, and disputes are decided by ad hoc panels composed of independent experts.8 However, NAFTA contains a number of provisions that combine to make the panel process appear more judicial than the GATT dispute settlement process. Unlike GATT, NAFTA does not permit either of the disputing parties to block the formation of a panel. A panel must be established on delivery of a request by any NAFTA country.9 Moreover, if the panel determines that there has been a violation of the agreement, NAFTA authorizes the prevailing party in the dispute to impose economic sanctions against the other party unless a mutually satisfactory agreement is reached within thirty days after the final report is received.10 The NAFTA parties have also established Rules of Procedure assuring a right to at least one hearing, as well as the opportunity to provide initial and rebuttal written submissions.11 Finally, decisions of NAFTA panels are to be published within fifteen days, unless the Free Trade Commission decides otherwise.12 Many of these changes have also been incorporated into the dispute settlement process in the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, the NAFTA dispute settlement process is significantly less judicial than its WTO counterpart. Unlike the decisions of WTO panels, the decisions of NAFTA panels may not be appealed to any permanent appellate body. Moreover, the decisions of NAFTA panels are not binding either of the disputing parties. Instead, NAFTA provides that the disputing parties agree the resolution of the dispute, which normally shall conform with the panel's determinations and recommendations. …

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.850
Threshold uncertainty score0.521

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0010.001
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.014
GPT teacher head0.236
Teacher spread0.222 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations5
Published2003
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

Explore more

Same venueTexas international law journalSame topicInternational Arbitration and Investment LawFrench-language works237,207