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Selective Hard Compatibilism

2010· book-chapter· en· W2499612707 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

fundA Canadian funder is recorded on the work.
no affNo Canadian affiliation: this work is invisible to an affiliation-only frame.
No Canadian affiliation. An affiliation-only frame, the usual design, would never have seen this work. It is one of the works that make the case for inverting the frame.

Bibliographic record

VenueThe MIT Press eBooks · 2010
Typebook-chapter
Languageen
FieldNeuroscience
TopicFree Will and Agency
Canadian institutionsnot available
FundersQueen's UniversityMcGill University
KeywordsCompatibilismPsychologyPhilosophyEpistemologyMoral responsibility

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Recent work in compatibilist theory has focused a considerable amount of attention on the question of the nature of the capacities required for freedom and moral responsibility.Compatibilists, obviously, reject the suggestion that these capacities involve an ability to act otherwise in the same circumstances.That is, these capacities do not provide for any sort of libertarian, categorical free will.The difficulty, therefore, is to describe some plausible alternative theory that is richer and more satisfying than the classical compatibilist view that freedom is simply a matter of being able to do as one pleases or act according to the determination of one's own will.Many of the most influential contemporary compatibilist theorists have placed emphasis on developing some account of "rational selfcontrol" or "reasons-responsiveness." 1 The basic idea in theories of this kind is that free and responsible agents are capable of acting according to available reasons.Responsibility agency, therefore, is a function of a general ability to be guided by reasons or practical rationality.This is a view that has considerable attraction since it is able to account for intuitive and fundamental distinctions between humans and animals, adults and children, the sane and the insane, in respect of the issue of freedom and responsibility.This an area where the classical account plainly fails.In general terms, rational self-control or reasons-responsive views have two key components.The first is that a rational agent must be able to recognize the reasons that are available or present to her situation.The second is that an agent must be able to "translate" those (recognized) reasons into decisions and choices that guide her conduct.In other words, the agent must not only be aware of what reasons there are, she must also be capable of being moved by them.This leaves, of course, a number of significant problems to be solved.For example, any adequate theory of this Selective Hard Compatibilism

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Other · Consensus signal: Other
Teacher disagreement score0.714
Threshold uncertainty score0.993

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.001
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.073
GPT teacher head0.249
Teacher spread0.176 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it