Imperial Preference and the Anglo-American Loan Negotiations, September–December 1945
Bibliographic record
Abstract
The sudden end of the war brought relief and adversity to Britain. Long-anticipated economic difficulties mounted with alarming speed. The newly elected Labour government was desperate for aid to stave off a looming financial crisis. As Keynes had anticipated, the UK turned to the US for a loan. American officials were not surprised by the request, but they were not inclined to generosity. Washington believed there was now no longer a compelling reason to carry London. No matter what would result from Anglo-American financial negotiations, one thing was certain: US aid would come at a price. Securing British support for American postwar trade proposals was one obvious way of turning British weakness to American advantage. In particular, the US might be able to overcome British obstinacy over preferences by linking their commercial deliberations to the promise of financial assistance. Just as the Americans were intent on linking commercial and financial matters, British negotiators were determined to separate them. Consequently, the British delegation sent to Washington to negotiate the loan included no commercial experts in the hope that would limit the discussions to questions of finance. This ploy backfired. The Americans postponed financial talks until the British agreed to address outstanding commercial questions leading towards an outline for an International Trade Organization (ITO). These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.007 | 0.006 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.005 | 0.002 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.011 | 0.002 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".