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Record W2509167444 · doi:10.1111/japp.12238

Reclaiming Proportionality (Society for Applied Philosophy Annual Lecture 2016)

2016· article· en· W2509167444 on OpenAlexaff
Arthur Ripstein

Bibliographic record

VenueJournal of Applied Philosophy · 2016
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldArts and Humanities
TopicWar, Ethics, and Justification
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Toronto
Fundersnot available
KeywordsProportionality (law)WrongdoingConsequentialismMoralityLawLaw and economicsSociologyEpistemologyPolitical sciencePhilosophy

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

RIPSTEINMy aim in this lecture is to reclaim the idea of proportionality for a rights-based theory of interpersonal morality and law.The topic gets its interest from two directions.Recent philosophical writing about proportionality analyses it in terms of some weighted balance of goods to be achieved against harms that are created in the process.There is a great sophistication in this contemporary writing about proportionality, and many important distinctions between different occasions, in particular, between proportionality in the use of defensive force, and proportionality in the context of a broader judgment about the justification of so-called 'lesser evils'. 1 Prominent writers in this area reject consequentialism, restricting both the catalogue of goods to be weighed and the range of morally significant difference in weight.I will argue for a fundamentally different way of thinking about proportionality, which focuses not on the relation between good results and bad side effects, but instead on the restrictions on the use of means of enforcement that are otherwise available.Like many of these contemporary writers, I will treat the example of proportionality in the use of defensive force against wrongdoing as a central example.In addition to this philosophical interest, the topic has recently acquired a legal and moral urgency, as a result of the recent development of what purports to be a more narrowly rights-based perspective on the use of defensive force.In a number of American states, the law of self-defence has been modified to include what are called 'stand your ground' provisions, which entitle someone when faced with aggression or wrongdoing to use lethal force to prevent it.As the name suggests, under these regimes, there is no duty to retreat when faced with a wrongdoer.Instead, you can stand your ground against him.There are many objections that might be made to the application of these lawsthe extent to which they depend upon the defender's subjective beliefs about the danger posed by the supposed aggressor, 2 and the way in which on-going patterns of discrimination seem to be reinforced by them.Without in any way meaning to suggest that these are minor difficulties, I hope to use a discussion of proportionality to raise a different objection to them; in particular, focusing on the way in which they misunderstand the nature of rights and the nature of their enforcement.Stand your ground laws raise issues about necessity as well as proportionality; where traditional Anglo-American ideas about defensive force suppose it to be necessary only when retreat is impossible, stand your ground laws permit force as an alternative to retreat.The central issue is proportionality: the laws in question stand the defender's entitlement to stand his ground (not merely to preserve his life) as sufficient to justify the use of lethal force.In order to defend the idea that proportionality is about the acceptable use of means rather than the relation between good results and bad side effects, I will, as advertised

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.006
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.007
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.044
Threshold uncertainty score0.146

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0060.007
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0030.007
Scholarly communication0.0070.008
Open science0.0010.005
Research integrity0.0030.009
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0440.018

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.058
GPT teacher head0.258
Teacher spread0.200 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations9
Published2016
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

Explore more

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