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Record W25123987 · doi:10.1111/cdev.12275

The Process Dissociation of Moral Judgments: Clarifying the Psychology of Deontology and Utilitarianism

2013· article· en· W25123987 on OpenAlexfundno aff
Paul Conway

Bibliographic record

VenueChild Development · 2013
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldNeuroscience
TopicPsychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment
Canadian institutionsnot available
FundersSocial Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada
KeywordsDeontological ethicsHarmPsychologyConsequentialismLawrence Kohlberg's stages of moral developmentSocial psychologyUtilitarianismDual process theory (moral psychology)MoralityCognitionDilemmaPerspective (graphical)Moral reasoningEpistemologyPhilosophy

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

A growing body of work has examined responses to moral dilemmas where causing some degree of harm leads to a greater positive outcome; such dilemmas are said to pit deontological philosophical considerations (causing harm is never acceptable) against utilitarian philosophical considerations (causing harm is acceptable if it leads to the best possible outcome). According to dual-process theories of moral judgment, independent processes drive each judgment: affective reactions to harm drive deontological judgments, whereas cognitive evaluations of outcomes drive utilitarian judgments. Yet, theoretically both processes contribute to each judgment; therefore, it is an error to equate judgments with processes. To overcome this error, we adapted Jacoby’s (1991) process dissociation (PD) procedure to independently quantify the strength of deontological and utilitarian inclinations within individuals. Five studies presented in two articles support the conclusion that process dissociation taps the processes theorized to underlie moral judgments more effectively than overt dilemma judgments, and allows for increased insight into the nature of moral processing. In Conway and Gawronski (2013) Study 1, the PD parameters predicted theoretically relevant individual-difference variables (e.g., the utilitarian parameter uniquely predicted cognitive load, whereas the deontology parameter uniquely predicted empathic concern and perspective-taking). Moreover, both parameters predicted moral identity—a relation that was obscured using overt moral judgments. In Study 2, a cognitive load manipulation selectively reduced utilitarian inclinations, whereas in Study 3, a manipulation that increased the vividness of harm selectively increased the deontology parameter. Together, these findings suggest that the deontology parameter is tapping affective reactions to harm, and the utilitarian parameter is tapping cognitive evaluations of outcomes (consistent with theory). In Study 1 of Conway, Bartels, and Pizarro (under review), participants scoring higher in Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and meaninglessness made more overt utilitarian judgments (replicating past findings), but process dissociation revealed that this relation was due to decreased deontology rather than increased utilitarianism among people high in antisocial personality traits. Study 2 demonstrated that the deontology and utilitarian parameters each correlated with different kinds of prosociality. These findings clarify theoretical confusion regarding the nature of utilitarianism and deontology.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.004
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.012
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.004
Threshold uncertainty score0.021

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0040.012
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.000
Science and technology studies0.0010.011
Scholarly communication0.0030.005
Open science0.0000.003
Research integrity0.0010.002
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0020.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.067
GPT teacher head0.298
Teacher spread0.231 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designObservational
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations1
Published2013
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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