Bibliographic record
Abstract
It seems trite to say privacy is valuable. The Supreme Court of Canada has emphasized that privacy is worthy of constitutional protection. Scholars tend to agree that privacy is a fundamental moral and political concept. The consensus appears to end, however, when privacy in theory approaches privacy in practice. As a broad and evanescent concept, opinions differ as to what interests or values the protection of privacy is designed to achieve. The prevailing conceptions of privacy — six of which have been identified — fall prey to substantive criticisms from which, the author contends, they cannot recover. First, they suffer from intuitionism. That is, they offer an intuitive approach of what makes things "private" and incorrectly assume that we all approach privacy with a common understanding of the concept, or concepts, that the term "privacy" expresses. Further, the standing conceptions of privacy depend upon and serve the concept of privacy as liberty which itself is flawed. "Liberty" is seen as a form of licence, protecting — in its most crude form—an individual's right to do as he or she pleases. So viewed, it is not particularly surprising to see privacy attacked when competing "liberty" issues are at stake. Given the substantial criticisms with the prevailing conceptions of privacy, it may be worthwhile to reconsider the present paradigm against which privacy is conceived. It may be that privacy is better conceived of as an equality issue, not a liberty issue. The focus should shift away from conceptualizing privacy as a prerequisite for preventing invasions of various liberty interests to one of "maintaining conditions " that will make the exercise of those liberty interests possible. By limiting the ambit of privacy, we may indeed strengthen it.
Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.
How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.006 | 0.020 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.015 | 0.023 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.007 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.007 | 0.009 |
| Open science | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| Research integrity | 0.006 | 0.006 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.005 | 0.002 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".