<i>Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam</i>, by Edward Miller

Misalliance: Ngo Dinh Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam, by Edward Miller. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2013. vi, 419 pp. $39.95 US (cloth). Few areas of study are as contentious as the War, and wading into the historiographical waters is certainly not for the faint of heart. Edward Miller's most recent book, however, is on solid ground; it provides a very welcome addition to the fields of both American foreign relations and Vietnamese studies. The relationship between the United States and Ngo Dinh Diem, the first president of South from 1954-63, is an interesting one, albeit one that is frequently misunderstood. In part the rigid historiography of the War is to blame, with often coming across as two dimensional--as a US puppet or a product of tradition (p. 14)--rather than a fully-formed individual. Building on the trend of international scholars studying Vietnam, Miller's research moves beyond traditional American diplomatic sources and includes impressive French and Vietnamese archival material, providing a very well-rounded understanding of the subject matter. He also displays a strong understanding of the secondary literature which allows him to seamlessly discuss competing historical interpretations of and American foreign relations, yet he does so without becoming pigeon-holed in one of the rigid, and competing, schools of thought. This approach allows Miller to produce a nuanced and compelling piece of scholarship. Miller states that his about US-RVN relations during the era are more qualified and less black-and-white than the conclusions drawn by some other historians (p. 10), though he certainly has no problem asserting his views. According to Miller, US military advisor John Paul Vann incorrect on almost every point (p. 252), and all of these caricatures of are based on false assumptions, and of the conclusions drawn from them are wrong (p. 15). By situating the events, and personalities, in their international context--away from a simply US-centric view--Diem's relationship with the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations is better understood. It is also a relationship, according to Miller, where many of the most momentous and consequential actions were undertaken in South Vietnam (p. 10). By looking at Diem's career before 1954--a topic which has received surprisingly little attention from scholars--Miller demonstrates that neither plucked from obscurity nor installed in office by the US in 1954 (p. 20). served briefly as Interior Minister in the early 1930s and, with the help of his extensive family relations, maneuvered very actively for political advantage for the next two decades. When he was appointed Prime Minister in 1954, and subsequently became President in 1956, he came to power with a definite agenda. It is this agenda of around which Miller weaves his narrative, contending that nation-building and agendas played central roles in the formation, evolution, and eventual undoing of Washington's relations with Diem (p. …

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