Private and Efficient Query Processing on Outsourced Genomic Databases
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Applications of genomic studies are spreading rapidly in many domains of science and technology such as healthcare, biomedical research, direct-to-consumer services, and legal and forensic. However, there are a number of obstacles that make it hard to access and process a big genomic database for these applications. First, sequencing genomic sequence is a time consuming and expensive process. Second, it requires large-scale computation and storage systems to process genomic sequences. Third, genomic databases are often owned by different organizations, and thus, not available for public usage. Cloud computing paradigm can be leveraged to facilitate the creation and sharing of big genomic databases for these applications. Genomic data owners can outsource their databases in a centralized cloud server to ease the access of their databases. However, data owners are reluctant to adopt this model, as it requires outsourcing the data to an untrusted cloud service provider that may cause data breaches. In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving model for outsourcing genomic data to a cloud. The proposed model enables query processing while providing privacy protection of genomic databases. Privacy of the individuals is guaranteed by permuting and adding fake genomic records in the database. These techniques allow cloud to evaluate count and top-k queries securely and efficiently. Experimental results demonstrate that a count and a top-k query over 40 Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms (SNPs) in a database of 20 000 records takes around 100 and 150 s, respectively.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.002 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Open science | 0.003 | 0.004 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".