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Record W2549743857 · doi:10.1145/3055399.3055465

Simple mechanisms for subadditive buyers via duality

2017· article· en· W2549743857 on OpenAlexafffund
Yang Cai, Mingfei Zhao

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsMcGill University
FundersFonds de recherche du Québec – Nature et technologiesNatural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada
KeywordsSubadditivityRevenueSimple (philosophy)Incentive compatibilityMechanism designComputer scienceBenchmark (surveying)Revenue managementUpper and lower boundsIncentiveBayesian probabilityMathematical economicsDuality (order theory)Submodular set functionCompetitive analysisMathematical optimizationMathematicsMicroeconomicsCombinatoricsEconomicsArtificial intelligenceFinance

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

We provide simple and approximately revenue-optimal mechanisms in the multi-item multi-bidder settings. We unify and improve all previous results, as well as generalize the results to broader cases. In particular, we prove that the better of the following two simple, deterministic and Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatible mechanisms, a sequential posted price mechanism or an anonymous sequential posted price mechanism with entry fee, achieves a constant fraction of the optimal revenue among all randomized, Bayesian Incentive Compatible mechanisms, when buyers' valuations are XOS over independent items. If the buyers' valuations are subadditive over independent items, the approximation factor degrades to O(logm), where m is the number of items. We obtain our results by first extending the Cai-Devanur-Weinberg duality framework to derive an effective benchmark of the optimal revenue for subadditive bidders, and then analyzing this upper bound with new techniques.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.010
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.026
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.010
Threshold uncertainty score0.051

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0100.026
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0020.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0030.003
Bibliometrics0.0020.003
Science and technology studies0.0010.003
Scholarly communication0.0040.010
Open science0.0050.004
Research integrity0.0030.004
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0060.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.187
GPT teacher head0.469
Teacher spread0.283 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations109
Published2017
Admission routes2
Has abstractyes

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Same topicAuction Theory and ApplicationsFrench-language works237,207