MétaCan
Menu
Back to cohort

Strategic Interactions in Antiviral Drug Use During an Influenza Pandemic

2017· article· en· W2575639384 on OpenAlex

Why this work is in the frame

A frame that forgets how it found something cannot be audited. These are the routes that admitted this work.

affAt least one author lists a Canadian institution in the pinned OpenAlex snapshot.

Bibliographic record

VenuePLoS Currents · 2017
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldMedicine
TopicInfluenza Virus Research Studies
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Guelph
Fundersnot available
KeywordsPandemicInfluenza pandemicAntiviral drugCoronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19)DrugH1n1 pandemic2019-20 coronavirus outbreakSevere acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2)VirologyInfluenza A virusMedicineComputer scienceData scienceVirusPharmacologyInfectious disease (medical specialty)DiseasePathologyOutbreak

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Background: The evolution of antiviral drug resistance during influenza pandemics has created widespread concern. Use of antiviral drugs is a main contributor to the evolution of drug-resistant strains. Moreover, there are recent examples of influenza viruses acquiring drug resistance seemingly without incurring a fitness penalty that reduces their transmission rate. This creates the possibility of strategic (game theoretical) interaction between jurisdictions making decisions about use of antiviral drug stockpiles. Methods: We developed and analyzed a 2-player 2-strategy game theoretical model. Each ‘player’ (an authority in a health jurisdiction) can choose to treat with antiviral drugs at a low rate or a high rate. High treatment rates are more likely to cause emergence of a drug-resistant strain, and once a drug-resistant strain has evolved, it can spread between the two jurisdictions. We determine the Nash equilibria of the game. Results: We show that there is a coordination game between the jurisdictions, where both players choosing a low treatment rate, or both choosing a high treatment rate, are the only stable outcomes. The socially optimal outcome occurs if both players cooperate by choosing a low treatment rate, thereby avoiding generating drug-resistant mutants. However, such cooperation may fail to materialize if the jurisdictions are closely connected through travel; if the drug-resistant mutant is tolerated (not seen as undesirable); or if the antiviral drug has partial efficacy against transmission of the drug-resistant strain. Conclusions: Inter-jurisdictional cooperation could be essential during a severe influenza pandemic, but we know little about how jurisdictions will interact in a scenario where highly pathogenic, drug-resistant mutant strains are able to transmit as effectively as non-resistant strains. Therefore, strategic multi-population interactions during influenza pandemics should be further studied.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.001
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: Observational
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.007
Threshold uncertainty score0.627

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.001
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.001
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.387
GPT teacher head0.479
Teacher spread0.092 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it