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Record W2586028893 · doi:10.1109/glocom.2016.7841537

A Randomized Reverse Auction for Cost-Constrained D2D Content Distribution

2016· article· en· W2586028893 on OpenAlexaff
Wei Song, Yiming Zhao

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsUniversity of New Brunswick
Fundersnot available
KeywordsComputer scienceReverse auctionContent distributionMathematical optimizationCommon value auctionComputer networkMicroeconomicsMathematicsEconomics

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Device-to-device (D2D) communications are not only featured by high spectral and energy efficiency, but also offer appealing benefits for applications such as content distribution, traffic offloading and coverage expansion. In this paper, we consider a content distribution scenario where a base station (BS) can divert message requests to some source devices to be fulfilled via D2D communications and thereby save the resource cost. To maximize the BS's gain in cost saving, we need to properly assign a broadcast message for each source and decide the payment to incentivize participation. The message selection is an NP-hard problem, while the payment determination is also nontrivial. The payment should be sufficient to compensate for a source device's resource cost and meanwhile, incentivize the source to truthfully declare its private cost. Modeling the problem as a reverse auction, we develop a randomized mechanism which is truthful in expectation, individually rational, and subject to a polynomial computation time. Also, it maintains an approximation guarantee with respect to the fractional optimal solution. The numerical results show the performance of the randomized mechanism in the D2D content distribution scenario.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.004
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.005
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Methods · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.974
Threshold uncertainty score0.999

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0040.005
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0020.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.213
GPT teacher head0.400
Teacher spread0.187 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreMethods

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations18
Published2016
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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