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Record W2587508232 · doi:10.1109/trustcom.2016.0042

TPAHS: A Truthful and Profit Maximizing Double Auction for Heterogeneous Spectrums

2016· article· en· W2587508232 on OpenAlexaff
Tianqi Zhou, Bing Chen, Chunsheng Zhu, Xiangping Zhai

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsUniversity of British Columbia
Fundersnot available
KeywordsSpectrum auctionComputer scienceProfit (economics)Double auctionRevenue equivalenceSpectral efficiencyWirelessCombinatorial auctionFrequency allocationLeaseMicroeconomicsAuction theoryMathematical optimizationComputer networkTelecommunicationsEconomicsCommon value auctionMathematicsBeamformingFinance

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

In recent years, the auction has been widely applied in wireless communications for spectrum allocation, so that spectrum owners can lease their unutilized spectrum to secondary users. Both primary users and secondary users can get benefit from the auction. Moreover, the spectrum utilization is improved. Existing auction mechanisms either do not consider the heterogeneity of spectrums or pay little attention to the auction's economic efficiency. In this paper, we propose a Truthful and Profit maximizing double Auction for Heterogeneous Spectrums (TPAHS), which simultaneously considers spectrum heterogeneity and economic efficiency. Moreover, different from the most existing spectrum auction mechanisms which are based on interference graph, we consider a more realistic SINR (Signal-to-Interference-plus-Noise Ratio) model. We prove that TPAHS is truthful, individual-rational, budget-balanced and the experiments show that TPAHS improves the auctioneer's profit significantly.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.618
Threshold uncertainty score0.878

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0010.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.155
GPT teacher head0.397
Teacher spread0.242 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations7
Published2016
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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