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Record W2603931501

Maximin Envy-Free Division of Indivisible Items

2015· preprint· en· W2603931501 on OpenAlexaff
Steven J. Brams, Marc Kilgour, Christian Klamler

Bibliographic record

VenueMunich Personal RePEc Archive (Munich University) · 2015
Typepreprint
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicGame Theory and Voting Systems
Canadian institutionsWilfrid Laurier University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsMinimaxFair divisionRanking (information retrieval)Rank (graph theory)Pareto optimalMathematical economicsPareto principleComputer scienceAdversarySocial choice theoryDivision (mathematics)MicroeconomicsEconomicsMathematical optimizationMathematicsMulti-objective optimizationArtificial intelligenceCombinatoricsComputer security
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Assume that two players have strict rankings over an even number of indivisible items. We propose algorithms to find allocations of these items that are maximin—maximize the minimum rank of the items that the players receive—and are envy-free and Pareto-optimal if such allocations exist. We show that neither maximin nor envy-free allocations may satisfy other criteria of fairness, such as Borda maximinality. Although not strategy-proof, the algorithms would be difficult to manipulate unless a player has complete information about its opponent’s ranking. We assess the applicability of the algorithms to real-world problems, such as allocating marital property in a divorce or assigning people to committees or projects.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.002
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.001
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesMeta-epidemiology (narrow)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.468
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0020.001
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.001
Bibliometrics0.0020.001
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0030.005
Research integrity0.0000.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.055
GPT teacher head0.214
Teacher spread0.159 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2015
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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