Bibliographic record
Abstract
This thesis studies the economics of changes in financial and banking rules and regulations. Chapter 1 provides an empirical investigation of the impact of a regulatory change on domestic financial markets, and potential spillovers to international markets. Chapter 2 examines sweeping reforms to international financial and banking regulations from the perspective of central banks. Chapter 3 investigates how financial markets compete, both domestically and internationally, through the introduction of new exchange specific rule changes. In Chapter 1, I study how 2010 amendments to Regulation SHO, which impose temporary constraints on short sale trades after triggering a circuit breaker, impact trading. Using matching based analysis for in period variation, and a pre-regulation placebo counter factual test I find circuit breakers have a marked impact on most market measures for firms post circuit breaker. The regulation aims to improve liquidity, as evidenced through the measure of depth. I do find that depth improves, however, this change is driven by a change in the composition of depth which suggests that real liquidity diminishes after a circuit breaker has been triggered. In collaboration with Anita Anand and Albert Yoon, Chapter 2 examines the legal mandates of central banks prior to and following the recent financial crisis. We examine the mandates of central banks of 42 countries from 2002 to 2011. Across the sample, we find that most central banks have consistent, but not identical, mandates and that most mandates create discretionary rather than affirmative responsibilities. In addition, we find that the total number of central bank mandates has increased dramatically. In Chapter 3, with Katya Malinova and Andreas Park, we investigate how securities exchanges worldwide aim to incentivize liquidity provision introducing maker-taker fee structures. We analyze the impact of maker-taker pricing on market quality, by studying the 2006 introduction of maker rebates on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX). We find that measures of quoted and effective spreads tighten, but depth declines. Benefits to liquidity providers decline while costs for liquidity demanders do not increase, even after accounting for rebates and increased fees, respectively, due to increased competition.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.005 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.002 | 0.003 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.005 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.003 | 0.004 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.003 | 0.004 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.017 | 0.003 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".