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Record W2611169487 · doi:10.1111/sjoe.12402

Effects of Insurance Incentives on Road Safety: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in China*

2019· article· en· W2611169487 on OpenAlexaff
Georges Dionne, Ying Liu

Bibliographic record

VenueScandinavian Journal of Economics · 2019
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicHealthcare Policy and Management
Canadian institutionsHEC Montréal
Fundersnot available
KeywordsMoral hazardIncentiveChinaNatural experimentEmpirical evidenceActuarial scienceEconomicsAutomobile insuranceHazardPublic economicsMicroeconomicsPolitical scienceLaw

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Abstract We contribute to the growing body of literature on moral hazard by offering empirical evidence of the effectiveness of insurance pricing incentives at improving road safety. We do this by comparing the claim frequency following a regulatory reform introduced in a pilot city in China, with the experience of another city unaffected by the reform. By using a difference‐in‐differences methodology, we find that improving insurance pricing on past claims and on traffic violations with full industry commitment reduces moral hazard and insured drivers’ claim frequency by 12 percent. The treatment effects are, however, heterogeneous with respect to insured drivers’ wealth and their history of past claims.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: Observational
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.151
Threshold uncertainty score0.725

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.021
GPT teacher head0.254
Teacher spread0.233 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designObservational
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations11
Published2019
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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