Atomistic and Systems Approaches to Consciousness - eScholarship

Atomistic and Systems Approaches to Consciousness Andrew Brook (abrook@ccs.carleton.ca) Luke Jerzykiewicz (ljerzyki@ccs.carleton.ca) Cognitive Science, Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada Abstract The approach to consciousness taken by most philosophers is very different from the approach taken by most cognitive psychologists, so different that one could be forgiven for wondering if they are talking about the same thing. Most philosophers focus on individual psychological states. By contrast, most psychologists focus on properties of cognitive systems as a whole such as global workspace or attention. (Some philosophers favour this approach, too, Dennett and P. M. Churchland for example.) We will expose some of the peculiarities of the dominant philosophical approach and, by looking briefly into what is needed to give an adequate account of consciousness, advance some reasons for favouring the approach dominant among psychologists. Two Approaches to Consciousness Reading recent writings on consciousness by philosophers and cognitive psychologists, one could be forgiven for wondering if they are talking about the same thing. Most philosophers focus on individual psychological states n individual perceptions or feelings or imaginings n or at most tiny combinations of such states (Rosenthal, 1991; Chalmers, 1996; Tye 1995). Experimental psychologists by contrast focus on properties of cognitive systems as a whole: global workspace (Baars 1988), intermediate level of processing (Jackendoff 1987), or attention. Attention has been particularly singled out for ... attention. For Posner or Mack and Rock, for example, to be conscious of something simply is to pay attention to it (Posner 1994; Mack and Rock 1998). First we will lay out the main contours of the two dominant approaches, starting with the one favoured by most philosophers (though not all: both Dennett (1991) and P. M. Churchland (1995) favour the approach taken by psychologists). Then we will assess them. There are serious prima facie shortcomings in the dominant philosophical approach, but there is also a serious worry about the dominant psychological approach. To bring out these shortcomings and this worry, we will need to distinguish two kinds of consciousness and lay out some of the things that an adequate account of consciousness must explain. The dominant approach in philosophy Two things characterize the dominant approach to consciousness in recent philosophical work on the topic. The first is a kind of atomism. These philosophers tend to talk about conscious states one by one (ewhat is it like for something to look red?i) or at most in tiny groups. In both cases, the cognitive system that has them is pretty much ignored. (Theorists may add, e...look red to mei but they do nothing with the addition.) Almost the whole of the massive literature on qualia exhibits this feature. (Qualia are the felt quality of conscious states, ewhat it is like to have themi, in Thomas Nagelis (1974) famous phrase.) The thing that has such states, the subject of conscious states, is ignored. Let us call this view of consciousness atomism. Atomism n the view that conscious states can be studied one by one or in small groups, without reference to the cognitive system that has them. When you think about it, this atomism is remarkable. It seems obvious that consciousness does not come in atomically separable states in this way. This atomism about consciousness goes with another view that we will call local realism. Local realism is the view that consciousness or what is distinctive about consciousness, for example that in virtue of which it is like something to have a psychological state, is a property of individual psychological states or tiny groups of psychological states. Local realism n the view that consciousness or what is distinctive about consciousness is either a non- relational property of individual psychological states or a relationship among very small numbers of psychological states. Specifically, this approach to consciousness views it as either a nonrelational property of single psychological states or, though a relational property, one that ties only very small groups of psychological states to one another. A relationship between one state and another single state would be an example. This account is not very precise but it is precise enough for our purposes. What matters is the contrast with the kind of properties that figure centrally in theories that view consciousness as a relationship between a great many psychological states and a conscious being

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