Bibliographic record
Abstract
A year ago, Leonid Radzikhovsky, one of Russia's more thoughtful journalists, wrote that Russia should put aside reservations and make the most of chances for cooperation with the real, existing West. The point was to stop waiting for the West to become nicer to Russia; the reason was that Russia needs the West, strategically as well as economically. And whatever kind of West Russia might like to have in an ideal world, the one that is out there right now is the only West that Russia has. That real, existing West organizes common strategic affairs through NATO. Radzikhovsky's advice to his country, thus, would seem to be reducible to this: make your peace with NATO, do everything to make cooperation with NATO effective, bend every diplomatic effort to build this relationship into a real alliance because in security affairs, NATO is the only West we have. Is that what Radzikhovsky's advice really boils down to? Does the Russian elite agree that NATO is, in a basic sense, the only West it has? To a great extent it does. However, the path to that conclusion has been tortuous and the result remains largely an abstraction. It is not yet in a definitive, stabilized form; it remains a dependent function of the further development of Russia-NATO relations. When President Putin came to office in 1999, the Russian elite certainly did not accept NATO as its West. It was fed up with NATO. It saw no prospect for Russia's entry into the alliance. It saw no prospect, either, for a meaningful partnership based on mutual attentiveness; quite the opposite, it was given to depicting the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Permanent Joint Council as a fraud and a deception. Its mindset was deeply affected by the Kosovo war and by own rhetorical campaign against NATO's role in that war. Some in the new Putin government were blaming the country's problems in Chechnya on a supposed U.S.-NATO strategy of driving Russia out of the Caucasus. Putin himself, while speaking more carefully and proclaiming Russia's European credentials, did so not in a language of Euro-Atlanticism, but in the name of a non-Atlantic Europe, one potentially compatible with Eurasianism. Even after a year in power, when Putin spoke of eventually joining the EU and of meanwhile supporting the euro and joining a new EU defense force, it was with the transparent intention of damaging the dollar and displacing NATO. It was reminiscent of the Brezhnev years in the early 1970s, when a European Home was a slogan that meant a home the Atlantic to the Urals, excluding America as an unwelcome guest. It was as if the elite had forgotten everything it had learned in the meantime, during the years of glasnost. The Learning Experience in Russia, 1985-91 In the intermediate years after 1985, Russia had begun a more serious and honest pursuit of a European It quickly discovered that it could not afford to try to exclude America that home or there would be no space for Russia either. The only options were (a) a Little Europe, from Brest to or (b) a Greater Europe, a Vancouver to Gorbachev began polemicizing after 1989 against the formulations of the Little Europe of the EU, which stopped at Brest, and welcoming the formulations of James Baker on the Greater Europe, the one Vancouver to Vladivostok. That Greater Europe was labeled by Baker a New Atlanticism. (1) Russians took note: their only prospective home was in the Atlantic world. By 1990, there was discussion in the Moscow media on NATO becoming one of the permanent foundations of the Common Home. The East Bloc home of the Warsaw Pact was coming apart at the seams, and the inner Soviet home was threatened with the same fate; but no real, common, all-European home was yet on the horizon. Chaos was feared. Late 1990 saw a pro forma institutionalization of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE); due to Western suspicions it was kept in a weak form and did nothing to alleviate the concern for getting a roof over the head of the emerging countries. …
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame distilled prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.
Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.004 | 0.002 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Research integrity | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".