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Record W265249571 · doi:10.1177/002070200706200316

A Pattern of Constraint

2007· article· en· W265249571 on OpenAlexaboutno aff
Timothy Andrews Sayle

Bibliographic record

VenueInternational Journal Canada s Journal of Global Policy Analysis · 2007
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldSocial Sciences
TopicKorean Peninsula Historical and Political Studies
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsConstraint (computer-aided design)Political scienceComputer scienceMathematicsGeometry

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

The nature of the Canadian-American relationship during the Korean War (1950-53) has been debated for over 30 years. In 1974, political scientist Denis Stairs argued that Canadians pressed for greater UN control over the prosecution of the American-led war to prevent military escalation. officials, he explained, it was essential to moderate and constrain the course of American decisions in the far east.1 In 1992, historian Robert Prince challenged this interpretation. Drawing largely from recently released documents from the Department of External Affairs (DEA), he contended that Canada and America had had similar goals in Korea. Moreover, thanks largely to their to maintain influence in Washington and their fears of splitting the western alliance, the diplomats from Ottawa were limited in their ability to constrain their most significant ally.2 More recently, historian John Price has corroborated Prince's argument by demonstrating how, during the negotiations to create the United Nations temporary commission on Korea in 1947, Canada's undersecretary of state for external affairs, Lester Pearson, was focusing on cementing a Cold War partnership with the United at virtually any cost.3In spite of the legitimacy of their evidence, Stairs's detractors are not entirely convincing. Certainly, it is reasonable to question whether Canada and the United States placed the same value on the security of Korea. While the Americans felt it was crucial to their interests, the advisor to Canada's ambassador to the United States described Korea in his memoirs as a conflict whose objectives were at best peripheral to our own.4 And Canadian Minister of Defence Brooke Claxton suggested at the time that the United States was getting [Canada] into something to which there really was no end.5 Canada was also certainly limited in its ability to influence American activity in Korea. But the evidence that it did not wish to restrain-or constrain - the United States is more ambiguous. Specifically, Canada was prepared to use the full extent of its diplomatic capital to keep the Americans from undertaking any atomic offensive deemed unnecessary by Ottawa. Primary documents of top-secret Canadian-American consultations reveal that constraint was a pattern in Canadian foreign policy, resulting from differing Canadian-American approaches to the early Cold War.Fears that America was actively considering atomic strikes resulted from comments made by the president of the United States five months into the Korean War. On 30 November 1950, Harry Truman told American reporters that Washington would not require United Nations authorization to initiate an atomic attack. The mention of atomic weapons was impromptu, and reporters were under orders not to quote the president verbatim. Nonetheless, precise transcripts of the press conference were disseminated to foreign embassies in Washington by media sources.Reports of America's hawkishness generated significant concern among nations who had committed troops to follow US orders in the far east. The Canadian government quickly dispatched a letter to Washington declaring its strong opposition to the use of atomic weapons in Korea, while the Britain Prime Minister Clement Attlee was petitioned to make an immediate trip to Washington to discuss the matter.As a result of Attlee's December 1950 discussions in Washington, the British and American governments issued a joint communique declaring the importance of strong allied cohesion in Korea to prevent any possible Soviet aggression in the east. The announcement was also an attempt to calm allied concerns that the United States was considering the unilateral deployment of atomic weapons. Truman declared that it was his hope that world conditions would never call for the use of the atomic bomb, and went on to express his desire to keep the Prime Minister at all times informed of developments which might bring about a change in the situation. …

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.001
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.745
Threshold uncertainty score0.779

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.001
Bibliometrics0.0000.001
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.013
GPT teacher head0.339
Teacher spread0.327 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designNot applicable
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations3
Published2007
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

Explore more

Same venueInternational Journal Canada s Journal of Global Policy AnalysisSame topicKorean Peninsula Historical and Political StudiesFrench-language works237,207