MétaCan
Menu
Back to cohort
Record W2729220585

Business Models and Incentives in Rating Markets: Three Essays

2012· dissertation· en· W2729220585 on OpenAlexaboutno aff
Paul Seaborn

Bibliographic record

VenueTSpace (University of Toronto) · 2012
Typedissertation
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicBanking stability, regulation, efficiency
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsIncentiveEconomicsBusinessMicroeconomics
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

This dissertation consists of three essays linking the business models of rating agencies to the rating decisions these agencies make as market intermediaries between buyers and sellers.\nThe first study examines the link between a rating agency‟s primary revenue source and its rating decisions. Theoretically, rating payments could influence rating agency decisions or be counterbalanced by reputational rewards for rating accuracy. I explore this relationship in U.S. corporate credit ratings, where some agencies are primarily paid by bond issuers (sellers) and others by investors (buyers). Analysis of a balanced panel of 338 companies rated between 2005 and 2009 reveals that agencies produce differing ratings consistent with the preferences of their paying customers. Changes in buyer-paid ratings are more frequent and generally precede corresponding seller-paid rating changes. Seller-paid ratings are slower to incorporate negative information, particularly for rated firms in the financial services sector and firms with ratings above a critical grading cutoff.\nThe second study complements the first by estimating the gap between the rating information disclosed by sellers and the information sought by buyers, again using evidence from U.S. corporate credit ratings. While seller willingness to pay for an additional rating is highly concentrated among a subset of relatively high-quality firms, buyers demonstrate more uniform interest in additional ratings for firms at all quality levels. This finding highlights an information gap among high-risk firms that is not a major focus of existing regulation.\nThe third study focuses on rating decisions by government rating agencies, an alternative rating model to those examined in the first two studies. The empirical setting is Canadian film classification where the existence of multiple regional regulators has been justified by claims of variation in community standards. I find significant and increasing consistency in the regulatory decisions of these agencies, suggesting institutional isomorphism that brings into question the persistence of the parallel regional structure.\nOverall, these studies provide new empirical insight into the relevance of rating agency heterogeneity to firm strategy and policy. The findings may also be relevant to a variety of other settings involving information disclosure such as environmental impact and corporate social responsibility.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.005
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.017
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.006
Threshold uncertainty score0.025

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0050.017
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.001
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0010.007
Scholarly communication0.0050.009
Open science0.0010.002
Research integrity0.0040.004
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0060.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.020
GPT teacher head0.219
Teacher spread0.199 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2012
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

Explore more

Same venueTSpace (University of Toronto)Same topicBanking stability, regulation, efficiencyFrench-language works237,207