MétaCan
Menu
Back to cohort
Record W2731648274

What is, according to Peirce, the method of science? Is it the only way to fix belief?

2016· article· en· W2731648274 on OpenAlexvenueno aff
William F. Morgan

Bibliographic record

VenueAporia · 2016
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldArts and Humanities
TopicPragmatism in Philosophy and Education
Canadian institutionsnot available
Fundersnot available
KeywordsEpistemologySkepticismObject (grammar)PragmatismPhilosophySubject (documents)PsychologyComputer science
DOInot available

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

In this paper, I explore Peirce's claim that the method of science is the only way to permanently fix, or settle belief. Peirce considers four different methods of forming beliefs: The method of tenacity, the method of authority, the a priori method, and the method of science. Peirce argues that the first three methods of forming beliefs cannot fix belief because they are inconsistent with what Peirce calls the hypothesis of reality- the hypothesis that there is an external world independent of human opinion. Peirce argues that methods that are inconsistent with this hypothesis form beliefs that are subject to doubt, and cannot therefore fix belief. The method of science is however consistent with the hypothesis of reality and therefore can fix belief. I argue that Peirce is correct that the method of science is the only way to fix belief if one accepts the pragmatist theory of belief. Whilst one could object to Peirce that the hypothesis of reality is not certainly true, Peirce would not be swayed by such sceptical doubts, and he gives us positive reasons to reject them.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.001
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesInsufficient payload (model declined to judge)
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Not applicable · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.735
Threshold uncertainty score0.999

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0010.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0010.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.001
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0020.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.057
GPT teacher head0.327
Teacher spread0.271 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

Study designNot applicable
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2016
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

Explore more

Same venueAporiaSame topicPragmatism in Philosophy and EducationFrench-language works237,207