Two‐echelon supply chain operations under dual channels with differentiated productivities
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Abstract This paper examines a two‐echelon supply chain with an upstream supplier (she) and a downstream manufacturer (he) transacting an intermediate product via direct bilateral contracting and futures market channels with differentiated productivities. A game model is established to examine the dual‐channel supply chain operations. Analytical results reveal that downstream productivity improvement (DPI) through the bilateral interaction is necessary and sufficient for the supply chain members to trade in the bilateral channel in addition to the futures market. We show that when the price in the futures market increases, the manufacturer would purchase less from the futures market and more from the supplier, which not only increases the supplier's expected profit but also increases her risk (variance of the profit) in equilibrium. Furthermore, when the bilateral channel exhibits stronger DPI, the manufacturer obtains a higher expected profit and bears a higher risk, but the supplier enjoys a higher expected profit without incurring any additional risk.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.004 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.003 | 0.004 |
| Open science | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.005 | 0.000 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".