Dronkenskap as verweer in die Suid-Afrikaanse strafreg : 'n sober benadering? : regte

Die Suid-Afrikaanse strafreg het histories 'n ontoegeeflike benadering tot die dronkenskapverweer gevolg, maar later die Engelsregtelike reel van spesifieke opset aanvaar, wat 'n middeweg tussen die ontoegeeflike en toegeeflike benadering bied. Nadat die uitspraak in S v Chretien 1981 1 SA 1097 (A) in wese die reel van spesifieke opset afgeskaf het, moes die wetgewer noodgedwonge ingryp om die gevolge van die uitspraak te beheer. Hierdie artikel ondersoek of die daargestelde Strafregwysigingswet 1 van 1998, en bepaald artikel 1, na wense geformuleer is en 'n sober strafregtelike benadering tot die dronkenskapverweer bied. Dit geskied aan die hand van 'n uiteensetting en vergelyking van die historiese en huidige regstandpunte en wetgewing in Suid-Afrika en Kanada, waarvan die regsontwikkeling in die opsig duidelike ooreenkomste met die Suid-Afrikaanse toon. In albei jurisdiksies is die spesifieke-opset-reel na ingrypende hofsake afgeskaf en het dit moontlik geword om die dronkenskapverweer te opper vir misdade wat spesifieke opset en die wat slegs gewone opset vereis. Ter wille van orde moes albei jurisdiksies wetgewing uitvaardig: artikel 1 van die Suid-Afrikaanse 1998-wet skep 'n statutere misdaad waaraan 'n beskuldigde wat besope 'n misdryf pleeg, skuldig bevind mag word; die gewysigde Kanadese Strafwetboek weer skep die verweer van vrywillige dronkenskap, en stel vereistes vir die gebruik daarvan. Die vergelyking van die onderskeie stukke wetgewing dui daarop dat die voorgestelde wysigings aan artikel 1 van die wet waarmee De Chermont in 1998 vorendag gekom het, en wat outeurs soos Burchell ondersteun, kernleemtes in die Suid-Afrikaanse wet sal oorbrug en dit in pas met die (straks soberder) Kanadese wet sal bring. Aanbevelings ter versterking van De Chermont se voorstelle word ook gedoen, naamlik groter duidelikheid oor of artikel 1 vir iemand geld wat weens dronkenskap nie willekeurig kon handel nie, en 'n pertinente bepaling dat artikel 1 toegepas moet word op misdade wat tydens die ligste graad van dronkenskap gepleeg word maar opset nie gevorm kon word nie, indien 'n nalatigheidsopsie ontbreek. Intoxication as a defence in South African criminal law : a sober approach? In the main, a jurisdiction can take one of two approaches to intoxication as a defence in criminal law: the lenient or the unyielding approach. According to the lenient approach, the rules of criminal liability apply to intoxication as they would to any other crime. Perpetrators of crime who were intoxicated to such an extent that they did not act in the juristic sense of the word, were not accountable or could not form intent and may therefore be found not guilty of the offence charged. Thus intoxication may serve as a complete defence. On the other hand, the unyielding approach is based on the premise that it is unacceptable for a sober person to be punished for a crime while an intoxicated person who commits the very same crime goes scot-free. Therefore intoxication does not constitute a complete defence in countries which take the unyielding approach. In a crime-ridden country such as South Africa, which has some of the highest crime statistics in the world, choosing the correct approach is of the utmost importance. Historically, South African criminal law followed the unyielding route, but later adopted the rule of specific intent from English law, which constituted a middle course between the unyielding and more lenient approach. However, after the notorious Chretien judgment in essence disposed of the rule of specific intent, South Africa leaned towards the lenient approach. The legislature had no choice but to promulgate legislation in an attempt to contain the effects of that judgment. This article explores whether that legislation, the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1 of 1988, and in particular section 1, has been optimally formulated to provide a sober criminal law approach to intoxication as a defence. This occurs by way of analysing and comparing the historical and current legal positions and legislation in South Africa and Canada, as the development of this aspect of the law in the two jurisdictions shows certain striking similarities. In both jurisdictions the rule of specific intent was abolished following radical court rulings - Chretien in South Africa and R v Daviault 1994 3 SCR 63 (1994) in Canada - which paved the way for the defence of intoxication to be raised both in respect of crimes that require specific intent and in respect of those that require only general intent. For the sake of order, both jurisdictions had to promulgate legislation: The South African Criminal Law Amendment Act has created a statutory crime in section 1, of which an accused who committed a crime while intoxicated may be convicted. The amended Canadian Criminal Code, in turn, has codified the defence of voluntary intoxication, clearly stipulating the requirements for its use.

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