Bibliographic record
Abstract
On March 16, 1994, the U.N. Secretary-General, faced with the choice of withdrawing the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) that had been unable to complete its mandate in Croatia, or leaving it in a situation for which its size was inadequate, remarked that -the choice in Croatia is between continuing a mission that is clearly unable to fulfil its original mandate in full or withdrawing and risking a renewed war that would probably result in appeals for UNPROFOR to return to restore peace.Given such a choice, soldiering on in hope seems preferable to withdrawing in abdication.‖ 1 The remark exemplifies the choice facing the Security Council in a number of post-Cold War civil war situations.Doing nothing would have been seen as an -abdication‖ of responsibility, especially where the United Nations was the only organization available to act, and yet, for certain robust operations, the number of troops offered by Member States would clearly be unequal to the required tasks.Nevertheless, in the face of warning signs regarding the unlikelihood of Member States contributing troops or of the parties in conflict cooperating, the * Asist.Prof.Dr., Dicle University Faculty of Law 1 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 871 (1993), U.N. SCOR, p.45, U.N. Doc.S/1994/300 (1994).Security Council authorized U.N. operations, faute de mieux, in the hope that something would be better than nothing.In the light of a series of operations in which something was arguably not better than nothing, it is necessary to examine other ways in which the Security Council might meet its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.This Note will examine the consequences of the Security Council's decisions to deploy underresourced operations to civil war situations and various proposed means by which the Security Council might more effectively fulfill its responsibilities.Part II will look at a number of post-Cold War U.N. operations in civil wars-UNPROFOR in Croatia and Bosnia, United Nations Operation in Somalia I (UNOSOM I), and show how, at least partly because of the Security Council's failure to ensure that the operations it authorized were provided with sufficient numbers of adequately equipped troops, significant mandate elements could not be achieved. II. THE OPERATIONS A. UNPROFOR (Croatia)intervened in opposition. 2 On January 2, 1992, representatives of Croatia and the JNA signed an Implementing Accord on a cease-fire.3 At the end of January, the U.N. adopted the -Vance Plan,‖ which called for the creation of -U.N.Protected Areas‖ (UNPAs), overlapping with the areas which had contained a substantial proportion of Serbs before the war. 4 Once the agreement of Serbia, Croatia and the Croatian Serbs had, at least nominally, been obtained, the Security Council passed Resolution 743, establishing a United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) for the UNPAs.5 Tasks and objectivesAmong the tasks of UNPROFOR as envisaged in the Secretary-General's Report of December 11, 1991, was to ensure that the UNPAs -remained demilitarized and that all persons residing in them were protected from fear of armed attack.‖6 14,000 peacekeepers were authorized for the UNPAs, 7 but deployment was slow.8 It was not fully achieved until February 1993, one year after authorization.9 2 T. Modibo Ocran, How Blessed Were the UN Peacekeepers in Former Yugoslavia?The Involvement of UNPROFOR and Other UN Bodies in Humanitarian Activities and Human
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.003 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Open science | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Research integrity | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.008 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".