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Record W2748007047 · doi:10.1109/tvt.2017.2744560

Ascending-Price Progressive Spectrum Auction for Cognitive Radio Networks With Power-Constrained Multiradio Secondary Users

2017· article· en· W2748007047 on OpenAlexafffund
Changyan Yi, Jun Cai

Bibliographic record

VenueIEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology · 2017
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldComputer Science
TopicCognitive Radio Networks and Spectrum Sensing
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Manitoba
FundersNatural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada
KeywordsCognitive radioComputer scienceSpectrum auctionCommon value auctionRevenueBiddingIncentive compatibilityQuality of serviceMathematical optimizationComputer networkChannel (broadcasting)Auction theoryMicroeconomicsIncentiveRevenue equivalenceTelecommunicationsEconomicsMathematicsWireless

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

In this paper, we investigate spectrum sharing with power-constrained multiradio secondary users (SUs) in cognitive radio networks. The scenario under consideration consists of a primary spectrum owner who runs auctions for leasing her idle channels and multiple SU bidding for winning the usage of spectrum channels. Different from existing works in the literature with an assumption of single-minded SUs, in this paper, SUs can benefit from flexible quantity of channels. In addition, since each SU is ordinarily equipped with a fixed number of radios, she cannot utilize the amount of channels that exceed her radio capacity. Moreover, each SU has a certain power limitation so that the quality of service (QoS) of her transmission may also be constrained, even though the number of allocated channels is increased. To jointly address all these challenges, a novel ascending-price progressive auction algorithm is proposed, where the spectrum allocation decisions are made by gradually increasing the unit channel price. Theoretical analyses prove that the proposed algorithm meets the properties of QoS satisfaction, individual rationality, and incentive compatibility and achieves Pareto optimality. Simulation results further demonstrate that the proposed auction algorithm can improve both the auction revenue and the social welfare, and increase the number of winning SUs compared to the counterparts.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesMeta-epidemiology (narrow), Science and technology studies
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Simulation or modeling · Consensus signal: none
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.940
Threshold uncertainty score1.000

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0010.000
Science and technology studies0.0020.001
Scholarly communication0.0000.001
Open science0.0010.000
Research integrity0.0000.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.009
GPT teacher head0.241
Teacher spread0.232 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

Study designSimulation or modeling
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations39
Published2017
Admission routes2
Has abstractyes

Explore more

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