Defining federalism in Russia: The emergence of bilateralism in intergovernmental fiscal relations.

The dissertation examines the negotiation of the rules of federalism between the center and the regions in post-communist Russia. I argue that defining federalism---delineating areas of jurisdiction and authority between institutions at the national, regional, and local levels---encompasses a complex bargaining process among elites over federal authority as well as federal resources. Whereas much of the literature on federalism focuses on creating a blueprint for the sustainability of federalism, I contend that federal institutions represent the outcomes of often combative negotiations over the rules of the game. To explore this process, the dissertation focuses on the delineation of fiscal authority between the center and regions in the Russian Federation during the period from 1992 to 1998. I argue that the uncertain environment of Russia's transition and the widespread demands for fiscal reform led the central government to pursue bilateralism---direct negotiations and treaties between the executive branches of the central and regional governments---to resolve the country's fiscal and intergovernmental problems. Economically and politically stable regions benefited from the center's bilateral strategy, negotiating greater subnational control over local policy and resources, while poorer and fragmented regions continued to depend on a volatile center. Despite the short-term benefits of bilateralism to the center in terms of stability and political support, the resulting asymmetrical rulebook has emerged as a defining feature of Russia's system of federalism. The final chapter of the study addresses the ramifications of a bilateral system of federalism and its resultant asymmetries. I contrast the Russian case with two countries that rely primarily on multilateral intergovernmental institutions to define and reform federalism: Germany, following the incorporation of the eastern territories in 1990 and Canada during the federal debates of the 1980s and early 1990s. Within the confines of multilateral and consensual negotiations, regional elites must rely on intra-regional cooperation and compromise to resolve intergovernmental tensions. Whereas Russia's bilateral system possesses the potential for more rapid and extensive reform to the structure of federalism than the multilateral systems in Germany and Canada, it also contains the seeds for continuing conflict and challenges to federal arrangements.

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