The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement and States' Right to Regulate under International Investment Law
Bibliographic record
Abstract
The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (‘TPP’), which was signed in November 2015 by the United States, Japan, Canada, Mexico, Peru, Chile, Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, and Vietnam, is arguably the most significant trade and international investment protection deal since the creation of the European single market. The TPP was intended to establish a free trade area in the Asia-Pacific that accounts for nearly 40 percent of global GDP and a third of global trade. While the TPP was eventually not ratified following the U.S. administration’s announcement in January 2017 that it will not ratify the treaty, the other original TPP signatories concluded the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (‘CPTPP’), which adopted the most of the TPP’s provisions. The politics of the widespread skepticism towards the TPP and other international investment agreements (‘IIAs’) is complex and widely debated. This article focuses on one issue that has played an important role in framing the debate on the TPP: the potential impact of the TPP on States’ right to regulate for the public welfare under international investment law. The article concludes that the TPP’s Investment Chapter is evolutionary in its approach to foreign investment protection, and continues the recent trend in IIA practice to include language intended to safeguard host States’ legitimate public welfare objectives. Although the TPP’s Investment Chapter may not be radical, its provisions arguably reinforce the legal foundation for States’ right to regulate for the public welfare without incurring liability under international investment law. This may not, however, be enough to satisfy increasingly skeptical politicians and citizens of the merits of ratification.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.020 | 0.027 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.000 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.007 | 0.026 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.016 | 0.013 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.010 |
| Research integrity | 0.015 | 0.024 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.007 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".