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Record W2766269657 · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0187096

The effects of patient cost sharing on inpatient utilization, cost, and outcome

2017· article· en· W2766269657 on OpenAlexaff
Yuan Xu, Ning Li, Mingshan Lu, Elijah Dixon, Robert P. Myers, Rachel J. Jelley, Hude Quan

Bibliographic record

VenuePLoS ONE · 2017
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldEconomics, Econometrics and Finance
TopicHealthcare Systems and Reforms
Canadian institutionsUniversity of Calgary
Fundersnot available
KeywordsReimbursementCost sharingHealth careActuarial scienceIncentivePaymentTotal costBusinessMedicineMoral hazardEmergency medicineFinanceNursingEconomicsAccounting

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

BACKGROUND: Health insurance and provider payment reforms all over the world beg a key empirical question: what are the potential impacts of patient cost-sharing on health care utilization, cost and outcomes? The unique health insurance system and rich electronic medical record (EMR) data in China provides us a unique opportunity to study this topic. METHODS: Four years (2010 to 2014) of EMR data from one medical center in China were utilized, including 10,858 adult patients with liver diseases. We measured patient cost-sharing using actual reimbursement ratio (RR) which is allowed us to better capture financial incentive than using type of health insurance. A rigorous risk adjustment method was employed with both comorbidities and disease severity measures acting as risk adjustors. Associations between RR and health use, costs and outcome were analyzed by multivariate analyses. RESULTS: After risk adjustment, patients with more generous health insurance coverage (higher RR) were found to have longer hospital stay, higher total cost, higher medication cost, and higher ratio of medication to total cost, as well as higher number and likelihood that specific procedures were performed. CONCLUSION: Our study implied that patient cost-sharing affects health care services use and cost. This reflects how patients and physicians respond to financial incentives in the current healthcare system in China, and the responses could be a joint effect of both demand and supply side moral hazard. In order to contain cost and improve efficiency in the system, reforming provide payment and insurance scheme is urgently needed.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame distilled prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. Learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and 10,348 direct Gemma labels. Candidate is the union of thresholded teacher heads; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels or direct frontier model labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.000
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.000
Version: codex-gemma-dda1882f352aValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: Observational
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.034
Threshold uncertainty score0.281

Codex and Gemma teacher scores by category

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0000.000
Scholarly communication0.0000.000
Open science0.0000.000
Research integrity0.0000.000
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0000.000

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.143
GPT teacher head0.277
Teacher spread0.134 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one teacher head, not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designObservational
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations14
Published2017
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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