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Record W2790164589 · doi:10.22215/etd/2018-12696

Auctions and Finite Posted Prices in Online Markets

2018· dissertation· en· W2790164589 on OpenAlexaff
Alexander Maslov

Bibliographic record

Venuenot available
Typedissertation
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsCarleton University
Fundersnot available
KeywordsCommon value auctionMicroeconomicsValuation (finance)RevenueRevenue equivalenceReservation priceProfit (economics)English auctionEconomicsForward auctionAuction theoryBiddingReverse auctionBusiness

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

The thesis presents a model of a competing mechanism allowing buyers already engaged in an auction to decide whether to stay in it or buy an object from a posted price outside.In the first chapter I describe the relevance of the studied problem to the real world online platforms and discuss how my research contributes to the existing literature.I analyze buyers' game and show that when the amount of goods outside is less than the number of buyers, the latter, with valuations higher than the posted price, prefer to leave the auction early and buy the good at the posted price.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.004
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.021
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: none
Teacher disagreement score0.008
Threshold uncertainty score0.028

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0040.021
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0010.001
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0020.002
Bibliometrics0.0010.001
Science and technology studies0.0010.004
Scholarly communication0.0060.011
Open science0.0030.002
Research integrity0.0040.005
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0080.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.067
GPT teacher head0.418
Teacher spread0.351 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations2
Published2018
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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