Stable Combinatorial Spectrum Matching
Bibliographic record
Abstract
The use of a combinatorial auction is believed to be an effective way to distribute spectrum to buyers who have diversified valuations for different spectrum combinations. However, the allocation of spectrum with combinatorial auctions mainly aims at optimizing over certain utility functions, e.g., social welfare, but ignores individual preferences of buyers and sellers, who have incentives to deviate from globally optimal allocation results to improve their own utility. In this paper, we explore the possibility of designing a new stable matching algorithm for combinatorial spectrum allocations. Starkly different from existing efforts on spectrum matching mechanism design, our proposed combinatorial spectrum matching framework not only allows buyers to express preferences towards spectrum combinations (rather than individual channels), but also computes the payment that should be transferred from buyers to sellers. Payment determination, while essential in spectrum exchange, has never been addressed in existing spectrum matching frameworks. We design a novel algorithm to achieve a stable combinatorial spectrum matching and to compute the corresponding payment profiles. We conducted an extensive array of experiments to compare the performance of stable combinatorial spectrum matching with spectrum auctions. It is shown that the combinatorial spectrum matching sacrifices little allocation efficiency in terms of social welfare and spectrum utilization, but achieves a much higher individual buyer utility, which will incentivize buyers to participate and comply with the allocation results.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.002 | 0.010 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.000 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.002 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.003 | 0.003 |
| Open science | 0.003 | 0.002 |
| Research integrity | 0.002 | 0.001 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.005 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".