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Record W2792599612 · doi:10.1515/bejte-2016-0152

Limited Liability and High Bids in English Auctions

2018· article· en· W2792599612 on OpenAlexaff
Tao Wang, Ruqu Wang

Bibliographic record

VenueThe B E Journal of Theoretical Economics · 2018
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldDecision Sciences
TopicAuction Theory and Applications
Canadian institutionsQueen's University
FundersFundamental Research Funds for the Central UniversitiesCentral University Basic Research Fund of China
KeywordsLicenseBiddingMonopolyCommon value auctionBusinessMicroeconomicsEnglish auctionRevenueProduct (mathematics)ExternalityDutch auctionUnique bid auctionRevenue equivalenceAuction theoryEconomicsFinanceComputer science

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Abstract In this paper, we investigate how limited liability affects firms’ bidding behavior in license auctions. We focus on a model where firms first seek financing from banks, then bid for the licenses, and the winning firms set prices in a product market with uncertain demand. In a model of one license, the winning firm becomes a monopoly. A higher bid induces a higher product price. In a model of two licenses, a higher bid provides a positive externality to all other firms. In both models, bids are extremely high in the English auction, and the English auction always generates more revenue than the first-price/discriminatory auction.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.005
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.034
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Theoretical or conceptual · Consensus signal: Theoretical or conceptual
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.008
Threshold uncertainty score0.028

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0050.034
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0010.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0010.002
Scholarly communication0.0040.004
Open science0.0010.001
Research integrity0.0010.002
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0080.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.034
GPT teacher head0.318
Teacher spread0.284 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designTheoretical or conceptual
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations0
Published2018
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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