Implementation vulnerabilities in general quantum cryptography
Bibliographic record
Abstract
Quantum cryptography is information-theoretically secure owing to its solid basis in quantum mechanics. However, generally, initial implementations with practical imperfections might open loopholes, allowing an eavesdropper to compromise the security of a quantum cryptographic system. This has been shown to happen for quantum key distribution (QKD). Here we apply experience from implementation security of QKD to several other quantum cryptographic primitives. We survey quantum digital signatures, quantum secret sharing, source-independent quantum random number generation, quantum secure direct communication, and blind quantum computing. We propose how the eavesdropper could in principle exploit the loopholes to violate assumptions in these protocols, breaking their security properties. Applicable countermeasures are also discussed. It is important to consider potential implementation security issues early in protocol design, to shorten the path to future applications.
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How this classification was reachedexpand
Full frame machine prediction
Teacher imitationNot calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.
Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)
| Category | Codex | Gemma |
|---|---|---|
| Metaresearch | 0.008 | 0.021 |
| Meta-epidemiology (narrow) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Meta-epidemiology (broad) | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Bibliometrics | 0.001 | 0.001 |
| Science and technology studies | 0.002 | 0.010 |
| Scholarly communication | 0.004 | 0.011 |
| Open science | 0.002 | 0.005 |
| Research integrity | 0.004 | 0.005 |
| Insufficient payload (model declined to judge) | 0.004 | 0.001 |
Machine scores (provisional)
The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.
Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.
score_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from itClassification
machine, unvalidatedMachine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.
How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".