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Record W2805837051 · doi:10.5430/ijfr.v9n3p36

Effects of CEO Turnover and Board Composition Reform on Improvements in the Internal Control Quality

2018· article· en· W2805837051 on OpenAlexvenueno aff
Hiroshi Uemura

Bibliographic record

VenueInternational Journal of Financial Research · 2018
Typearticle
Languageen
FieldBusiness, Management and Accounting
TopicCorporate Finance and Governance
Canadian institutionsnot available
FundersJapan Society for the Promotion of Science
KeywordsAccountingCorporate governanceBusinessAuditAudit committeeAuditor independenceContext (archaeology)Government (linguistics)Internal controlFinancial accountingQuality auditControl (management)Internal auditAccounting information systemFinanceJoint auditEconomicsManagement

Abstract

fetched live from OpenAlex

Several serious accounting scandals have occurred in Japan in recent years (e.g., Olympus); however, the government, regulators, and auditing standard setters have struggled to identify new directions for corporate governance in listed companies, such as standard setting to address risks of fraud in an audit or the adoption of new corporate governance codes. The validity and effectiveness of monitoring by outside directors have received criticism within such a context. Nevertheless, in 2015, accounting fraud at Toshiba was discovered, which surprisingly involved upper management; the outside directors had failed to detect and prevent this fraud. Again, the monitoring function of the Japanese board of directors and outside directors was viewed with suspicion. Thus, this study examines Japanese corporations that disclose significant deficiencies (SDs) in internal controls over financial reporting (ICFR) and determines whether replacing the chief executive officer (CEO) and enhancing board members’ independence and financial expertise are followed by SD remediation. The results indicate that Japanese companies that disclose SDs in ICFR are more likely to replace their CEOs and enhance board independence. In addition, this study finds that although these actions do not affect SD remediation, upgrading the board’s accounting expertise does correlate positively with SD remediation. Moreover, if a company remediates a SD by increasing the number of accounting experts on the board, an increase in audit fees during the following term can be mitigated. These findings should be of interest to Japan’s regulators, auditing standard setters, and financial statement users when considering improvements in the quality of internal controls. In particular, these individuals must realize that the control environment is not improved in Japanese firms merely by replacing the CEO and increasing board independence, particularly because new CEOs encounter difficulties in changing the environment established by their predecessors.

Fetched live from OpenAlex and de-inverted. Abstracts are not stored in this database: the inverted indexes are 8.6 GB of the frame’s 9.3 GB of text, and the host has 13 GB free.

How this classification was reachedexpand

Full frame machine prediction

Teacher imitation

Not calibrated prevalence, not ground truth. Human validation pending. The Gemma side is a direct model label for every work in the frame, read from the title-only record. The Codex side is a classifier learned from the 10,348 direct Codex labels and calibrated to design-weighted sample rates; fields without enough sample support carry no Codex call. Candidate is the union of the two sides; consensus is their intersection. These outputs are machine_predicted_unvalidated and are not human labels.

metaresearch head score (Codex)0.002
metaresearch head score (Gemma)0.011
Version: metacan-v3-hybrid-931329e0061cValidation status: machine_predicted_unvalidated
Candidate categoriesnone
Consensus categoriesnone
DomainCandidate signal: none · Consensus signal: none
Study designCandidate signal: Observational · Consensus signal: Observational
GenreCandidate signal: Empirical · Consensus signal: Empirical
Teacher disagreement score0.007
Threshold uncertainty score0.022

Distilled classifier scores by category (both heads)

CategoryCodexGemma
Metaresearch0.0020.011
Meta-epidemiology (narrow)0.0000.000
Meta-epidemiology (broad)0.0000.000
Bibliometrics0.0000.000
Science and technology studies0.0010.000
Scholarly communication0.0010.001
Open science0.0000.001
Research integrity0.0010.001
Insufficient payload (model declined to judge)0.0070.001

Machine scores (provisional)

The two teacher heads of the student model, read on this work. A score orders the frame for review; it never asserts a category, and the validation status ships verbatim with every row.

Baseline scores from an immature model (maturity gate not passed, 7 training rounds). Scores rank; they never assert a category.

Opus teacher head0.032
GPT teacher head0.349
Teacher spread0.316 · how far apart the two teachers sit on this one work
Validation statusscore_only:v0-immature-baseline · verbatim from the scoring run: score_only means the number may rank works, and no category label ships from it

Classification

machine, unvalidated

Machine predicted; a candidate call from one source (direct Gemma or distilled Codex), not a consensus.

The models applied no category: nothing in the taxonomy fit this work.
Study designObservational
Domainnot available
GenreEmpirical

How this classification was reached, model by model and score by score, is at the end of the page under "How this classification was reached".

Quick stats

Citations1
Published2018
Admission routes1
Has abstractyes

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